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 Abstract 
Research on global governance has started from the end of Cold War, and mainly deals with 
both the positive and negative outcomes of globalization. Global governance could be 
defined as a global wide cooperation norm among different institutions on a wide range of 
levels. Global governance contains two tiers of meaning: making decisions on common good 
at global level and practicing them at a variety of levels. This theory is based on the 
presumption of global anarchy. 
China is a new participator of the global governance framework. By analyzing domestic 
academic studies and official documents, this thesis tries to figure out how does China 
interpret the notion of global governance and how does China participate in this framework. 
Moreover, dilemmas, limitations, and possible directions in the future of China’s 
participation in global governance will be discussed as well. 
 
Kurzfassung 
Die Forschung an Global Governance hat Ihren Ursprung am Ende des Kalten Krieges und 
beschäftigt sich hauptsächlich mit den Auswirkungen der Globalisierung. Global 
Governance kann als globale Norm zur Kooperation zwischen verschiedenen Institutionen 
auf unterschiedlichsten Ebenen definiert werden. Dabei beschriebt Global Governance zwei 
Grundbedeutungen: Das Treffen von Entscheidungen über das Gemeinwohl auf globaler 
Ebene sowie deren Ausführung auf einer Vielzahl von Ebenen. Diese Arbeit beruht auf der 
Annahme von globaler Anarchie. 
China ist ein neuer Mitspieler im Rahmen der Global Governance. Mit Hilfe der Analyse 
von inländischen wissenschaftlichen Studien sowie offiziellen Dokumenten versucht diese 
Thesis zu untersuchen wie China die Idee von Global Governance interpretiert und in 
ebendiesem System partizipiert. Desweiteren sollen Dilemmas, Beschränkungen sowie 
eventuelle Entwicklungsrichtungen in der Zukunft Chinas Teilnahme an Global Governance 
diskutiert werden. 
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Introduction 
The notion of global governance has burgeoned in the global arena today, especially in 
providing global goods and easing the negative outcomes of globalization, such as 
transnational crimes, epidemic diseases and environmental problems. There’s no denying 
that the presumable functions of global governance will contribute a lot to common good on 
the global scenario and the enhancement of interest and welfare of individuals. It is 
functioning in many areas such as world finance, economy, environment, transnational 
crime, and poverty eradication. Civil society and private sectors have been developing fast in 
recent decades, and filled the blank of many fields, in which the government could not 
effectively manage and administrate. Nation states and international governmental 
organizations are no longer the single actors on global arena. Individuals also acquire more 
opportunities in exerting influence on global affairs. Yet, its accountability and legitimacy 
have been doubted by the realist scholars, for its major actors perform functions by activities 
that do not originate with the governments. Lack in sufficient regulatory mechanisms is 
another shortcoming. Since China appeals for a harmonious world and a harmonious 
domestic society, its current and future participation in global governance has drawn 
worldwide attention. 
China has been integrating itself into the international system and it can be shown by China’s 
increasing presence in many international organizations and regimes. Meanwhile, instead of 
exclusively concentrating on state-centric politics, the understanding of international politics 
in the West tends to the concept of “good governance” and  “global governance”.1 
Therefore, it is important to view how does China, as the biggest developing country,                                                         
1 Lai-Ha Chan, Pak k. Lee, and Gerald Chan, “Rethinking Global Governance: A China Model in the 
Making?,” Contemporary Politics Vol. 14, no. 1 (March 2008): 3-19. 
 2 
interpret the notion of global governance and how does China participate in global 
governance as well.  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a more objective understanding about the 
emergence, definition and functions of global governance, giving credits to its contributions 
while admitting its weaknesses. Besides, the implications on China’s participation on global 
governance will be discussed. The methodology of comparative study and case study are 
applied in this thesis. This thesis is hoped to present an unbiased understanding about the 
notion of global governance and China’s participation in this framework. 
The first chapter will discuss the emergence and definition of global governance. Works that 
so far have been done by Western scholars will be paid special attention to. Difference 
between government and governance will be paid attention to and legitimate problem of 
global governance is mentioned as well. 
In the second chapter I will summarize main points about global governance from Chinese 
academic world and look into Chinese scholars’ understanding and interpretation of this 
concept and their arguments on how the world should be governed. In addition, inadequacy 
of recent domestic studies on global governance will be assessed.  
In the past five years, Chinese leaders have made and emphasized the idea of building a 
“harmonious world” in many important and solemn international arenas. The emergence 
and definition of “harmonious world” will be further explored in the third chapter. Some 
scholars hold that the discourse of “harmonious world” can be seen as the Chinese official 
version of global governance. I will try to examine the different philosophic backgrounds of 
“harmony” and “governance”, and two case studies will be involved to discuss how far the 
“harmony” has been achieved. 
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With rapid economic development, now China is becoming more influential in many parts 
of the world. However, if going through the history, we can see China still is a new member 
of the modern world. In the fourth chapter, I will go over China’s foreign policy on the 
process of China’s participation in international organizations and international system and 
analyze the history of China’s involvement in the world. And changes of Chinese views 
towards the international order and its place therein will be discussed as well. 
The fifth chapter will analyze dilemmas and limitations of China in global governance and in 
the last chapter, some possible choices and directions for the future will be given.  
I was in China during this winter (2010) and had substantial time to consult a number of 
sources (different government and non- government offices and libraries). For this research, 
I referred many primary resources such as Chinese government documents, official’s 
speeches and archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. I used published books, 
articles, journals, academic literatures and other non-government sources.  
The resources referred cover more than the scope that this thesis is about. However, 
theoretical study, case study, and data collection are necessary to the basic structure of the 
thesis. In addition, to ensure the diversity of references, books written by both Chinese and 
Western authors have been consulted to.  
Based on the study and research, I’ve found that most experts, both in China and in Western 
countries, hold a subjective view about the framework of global governance. Global 
governance is based on the presumption of turbulence of the world, as James N. Rosenau 
has stated in his book Global Governance in a Turbulent World. In Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World, which is edited by Rosenau, Oran Young and 
Ernst-Otto Czempiel showed positive attitude towards global governance, and considered 
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high of non-governmental actors of global governance. The legitimacy and accountability of 
actors in the framework of global governance need to be enhanced by the improvement of 
efficiency and functions, as the authors in Global Governance and Public Accountability 
edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi have noted. Chinese scholar Yu 
Keping presented a clear overview of the major achievements made by Western scholars in 
the field of global governance. In International Organization and Global Governance: A 
Reader, Second Edition, which is edited by Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, 
the realist and constructive view points on global governance were presented, too. All these 
experts have provided me with useful information so that I can continue my study. 
I got my BA in English and International Studies in China Foreign Affairs University. After 
two more years of master studies of Erasmus Mundus Global Studies, I have acquired skills 
in studying international relations between countries and issues of great importance that are 
happening in the world. I am quite interested in the issue of global governance, and I had 
written essays on the topics of international advocacy network, the development of civil 
society and good governance in EU and the complementary role of government and non-
governmental organization (NGO). So I chose this topic to explore what are the essential 
elements of global governance and China’s possible approach in this sphere. 
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Chapter One  The Notion of Global Governance 
The sweeping impact of globalization has set links between states and let no country isolate 
from the international society. As a new trend of governing, which started from the end of 
the Cold War, global governance is now widely accepted by the academic circle of 
international relations. However, scholars interpret this term in different ways. So it is 
necessary to clarify the original meaning of global governance. 
1.1 The Emergence of Global Governance 
“Global Governance” was presented at the end of the Cold War, which was an era of 
transition. In 1990, former President of the Socialist International, Chairman of the 
International Development Committee Willy Brandt convened a meeting in Königswinter, 
Germany. Palme (Chairman of Disarmament and Security Committee), Brundtland 
(Chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Development), Nyerere 
(Chairman of South Committee) and Carlsson (former Prime Minister of Sweden), and 
among others attended the meeting. The meeting discussed prospects for future’s 
development in the post-Cold War world. In 1991, they held a resumed session in Sweden, 
and published a report “the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance”. On 
the basis of both meetings, 28 international celebrities initiated and established the 
Commission on Global Governance2 in 1992, which was an organization co-chaired by 
Carlsson and Ramphal of Guyana. Besides, the World Bank’s 1992 annual report 
“Governance and Development” and the following annual reports expounded on the issues 
of global governance and anticorruption. The Commission on Global Governance also                                                         
2 Established in 1992 to analyze global changes in recent decades and to suggest ways in which the international 
community can better cooperate on global issues, the Commission works to capitalize on the myriad 
opportunities afforded the world community in the wake of the Cold War. 
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reported “Our Global Neighborhood” on the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations 
(UN) in 1995. The report expounded on concepts and values of global governance, as well 
as the relationship between global governance and global security, economic globalization, 
reform of the United Nations and the strengthening of the rule of law throughout the world. 
Since the last decade of the 20th century, many politicians and economists have shifted their 
focus onto global governance. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and former 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder jointly appealed for the Third Way and new centre 
in 1999. They hoped to build a sound and modern society of fairness, justice and equity, and 
apply their politics within a new economic framework, which is about addressing the 
concerns of people coping with societies undergoing rapid changes. 3  The former US 
president Clinton also probed for the third way, while leaving unanswered questions, such as 
“How do we make the most of the new global economy, create opportunity, and still keep 
the social contract?”4 
James Rosenau, one of these scholars who firstly studied global governance and one of the 
main founders of governance theory, started his study on the basis of the turbulence of the 
world. He viewed anarchy as lack of centralized authority in world politics. That situation 
implies a lack of patterned rule, a tendency of actors to go their own separate ways without 
regard for common principles, norms, rules and procedures.5 Meanwhile, Helen Milner 
interprets the state of anarchy in a similar way that the current situation of the international 
system could be seen as not on the extreme of completely chaos or hierarchy, rather, it is just                                                         
3 Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder, “Europe: The Third Way/ Die Neue Mitte: FCPP - Frontier Centre for 
Public Policy,” Frontier Centre for Public Policy, http://www.fcpp.org/publication.php/349. 
4 David Jessup, “Groping for the Third Way,” http://www.socialdemocratsusa.org/oldsite/Groping4-29-
99.html. 
5 James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without government: order and change in world politics 
(Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4. 
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on the way of continuum spectrum from global disorder to efficient global government.6 
In such an anarchic world nowadays, how could the international society cope with all the 
problems that emerge everyday? People in modern time are more closely linked in terms of 
politics and economy, but the diverse and overlapping jurisdiction over some global affairs 
calls for a more effective and systematic governance. According to Dr. Cai Tuo with China 
University of Political Science and Law, the causal facts of global governance are 
globalization, challenges of transnational problems, and the expansion of democratization.7 
Many transnational and global problems also see a sharp rise during the course of 
globalization recently. Issues concerning to economy, finance and transnational crimes, such 
as drug smuggling, illegal immigration, and transnational terrorism have ever increased. All 
this stems from the lacking of good, reasonable, and just governance. The absence of good 
administration is demonstrated through improper management and administration against 
economic crisis, and weak measures against environmental pollution. Besides, the practice of 
a normative consensus is not satisfying, such as lack of proper coercive methods to 
overcome disobeying. 
Since globalization is widely regarded as a double-edged sword, global governance will focus 
on both its benign and malign outcomes when coping with the changes brought about by 
globalization. Then, what is global governance? 
 
                                                         
6 Helen Milner, “The assumption of Anarchy in International Relation Theory: A Critique,” in International 
Organization and Global Governance: A Reader, Second Edition, ed. Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield 
(Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007), 16-17. 
7 Tuo Cai, Quanqiu Zhili he Zhongguo Gonggong Shiwu Guanli (Global Governance and the Management of China's Public 
Affairs) (Tianjin: Tianjin People's Press, 2005), 3-4. 
 8 
1.2 The Definition of Global Governance 
Since the 1990s, in terms of both theoretical studies and practices of its impact, global 
governance attracted the international community’s attention. To some extents, together 
with the theory and practice of globalization, global governance is becoming the theme of 
the 21st century, and it comprehensively dominates and directs the development of human 
beings and their future. 
As a newborn and developing theory, the concept and essence of global governance will not 
only work controversially, but also have many existing uncertainties. Nevertheless, through 
results of existing research, we can still make the following summary and comments: 
Global governance is the expansion and practice of governance at the international level. 
Although there are many differences between these two concepts, in terms of basic spirit 
and core connotation, they are obviously the same or interlinked.8 Hence, the concept of 
global governance is often linked together with governance. So far, the most cited definition 
of global governance by the academic community is made by the Commission on Global 
Governance. It states that, “Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process 
through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative 
action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, 
as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or 
perceive to be in their interest”.9 Subsequently, the report explained governance on the 
national and international levels respectively. “At the global level, governance has been 
                                                        
8 Tuo Cai, “Quanqiu Zhili de Zhongguo Shijiao yu Shijian (China's Perspectives and Practices towards Global 
Governance),” China Academic Journal, no. 1 (2004): 94-106. 
9 Commission on Global Governance, Our global neighbourhood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4. 
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viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also 
involving NGOs, citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital 
market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence”.10 
One of the simplest and clearest definitions of global governance is described by Rosenau. 
He defines governance through the comparison of governance and government, 
“Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It 
embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental 
mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy 
their needs, and fulfill their wants.”11 “…Global governance is conceived to include systems 
of rule at all levels of human activity-from the family to the international organization-in 
which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational 
repercussions…in an ever more interdependent world where what happens in one corner or 
at one level may have consequences for what occurs at every other corner and level…”12 
Later on, Rosenau further stated that governance is a mechanism that guides social system to 
achieve its objective. It is a very appropriate concept of understanding the new world with 
altered borders, redirected legitimacy sentiments, impaired or paralyzed governments, and 
new identities.13 Besides, according to Oran Young, governance is “a social function centered 
on the making of collective choices regarding matters of common concern to the members 
of human groups”.14 The core of global governance is to set up a series of norms, based on 
                                                        
10 Ibid. 
11 James N. Rosenau, “Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics,” in Governance without Government: 
Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (Cambrige: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 4. 
12 James N. Rosenau, “Governance in the Twenty-First Century,” Global Governance 1 (1995): 13. 
13 James N. Rosenau, “Toward and ontology for global governance,” in Approaches to global governance theory, ed. 
Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 287. 
14 Oran R. Young, Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experiences (Dartmouth College: 
Occasional Paper from the Dichey Center, 1995), 6-7. 
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which the global problems could be resolved. The governing pattern could either be the 
traditional way of top-bottom, or bottom-top and interaction of authorities from various 
levels. Institutions that get involved in this system include not only traditional players such as 
nation states or international governmental organizations, but also those newly emerging 
ones like transnational corporations and civil society. Some authors concern that global 
governance somehow weakens national sovereignty by some form of supranational hierarchy. 
In the words of Ulrich Brand, “The discourse of Global Governance…serves as a means to 
deal more effectively with the crisis-prone consequences caused by postfordist-neoliberal 
social transformations.” 15  Another well-known scholars of global governance, Tony 
McGrew, put global governance on the position of multi-level global governance. He said, 
“Multi-level global governance refers to a gradual (formal and informal) political cooperative 
system, which is from local to global and between central authority and private sector. It 
aimed at achieving common goals and solving common problems by formulating and 
implementing global or transnational norms, principles, plans and policies”. 16  In Held, 
McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton’s influential book Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, 
and Culture, they also mentioned, “by global governance is meant not only the formal 
institutions and organizations through which the rules and norms governing world order are 
(or are not) made and sustained – the institutions of state, intergovernmental cooperation 
and so on – but also all those organizations and pressure groups  - from MNCs, 
transnational social movements, to the plethora of non-governmental organizations – which 
pursue goals and objectives which have a bearing on transnational rule and authority                                                         
15 Ulrich Brand, “Nach dem Fordismus: Global Governance als der Neue Hegemoniale Diskurs des 
Internationalen Politikverständnisses’ (After Fordism: Global Governance as the new hegemonial discourse of 
the international understanding of politics),” Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen Vol. 10, no. 1 (2003): 143-165. 
16 Anthony McGrew, “Zouxiang Zhenzheng de Quanqiu Zhili (Towards Real Global Governance),” in 
Quanqiuhua: Quanqiu Zhili (Globalization: Global Governance), ed. Keping Yu, trans. Jiagang Chen (Beijing: Shehui 
Kexue Wenxian Press, 2003), 151. 
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systems”. 17  Beate Kohler-Koch, one of influential scholars in the study of European 
governance, pointed out that governance is gradually understood as “…more flexibility; 
greater decentralization and more public-private co-operation is believed to be more 
responsive to stake-holder needs and, as a consequence, improve policy output and 
compliance”. 18  Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara points, “Governance involves building 
consensus, or obtaining the consent or acquiescence necessary to carry out a programme, in 
an arena where many different interests are in play. Meanwhile, once governance is applied 
to globalization and multinational organizations, then global governance emerged. Through 
institutional innovation, it aims at dealing with global problems by way of connecting 
individuals and institutions at home and abroad of all sectors of the society.”19 Leon 
Gordenker and Thomas Weiss directly gave a definition to global governance. “We define 
global governance as efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and 
political issues that go beyond capacities of states to address individually”.20 After reviewing 
literatures on global governance, Chinese scholar Yu Keping summarized its ten major 
elements: legitimacy, rule of law, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, effectiveness, 
civic participation or engagement, stability, cleanness, and justice.21  
Described above is just some scholars’ point of view and they are trying to make a definition 
of governance or of global governance. More scholars interpret the meaning of governance 
                                                        
17 David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999), 50. 
18 Beate Kohler-Koch, “European Governance and System Integration,” European Governance Papers 
(EUROGOV), no. No. C-05-01 (2005): 14, www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-01.pdf. 
19 Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, “Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Governance,” International Social Science 
Journal 50, no. 155 (1998): 1, 7. 
20 Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, “Pluralising Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and 
Dimensions,” Third World Quarterly 16, no. 3 (September 1995): 1. 
21 Keping Yu, “Quanqiu Zhili Yinlun (Introduction to Global Governance),” in Quanqiu Zhili (Global Governance), 
ed. Jisi Wang, vol. 8, Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie (World Politics: Views from China) (Hong Kong: Peace 
Book Corporation, 2006), 13-16. 
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and global governance through the summary description of its constituent elements, the 
description of its manifestations, as well as its characteristics. On the basis of research results 
of other scholars, Cai Tuo made such a definition, drawing on global governance, “The so-
called global governance is multi-actors’ equal dialogue, consultation and cooperation, which 
value-oriented by the theory of humanity as a whole and the theory of common interests; 
global governance is new rule, mechanism, method and activity that jointly cope with global 
change and global challenge in order to manage the public affairs of mankind”.22 In the 
Chinese definition, global governance is ruled by a predefined harmony rather than the result 
of a multi-control process. In his paper, Cai continued that in understanding and grasping 
the essence of global governance, people should note the following features and contents: 
we should change our views from governmental to non-governmental, from state to society, 
from territorial politics to non-territorial politics, from compulsory, hierarchical management 
to equal, consultative, voluntary, and network management. Last but not least, global 
governance is a special political authority. Global governance expanded political authority, 
but it did not abolish the authority of state or government. In terms of the expansion of 
authority, the power of state and government that monopolized political authority for 
longtime, is weakened. It is irrational to deny this; however, concerning of political authority, 
in which the state and government should exercise and retain, it is not weakened so far, and 
should not be weakened in the future. In this regard, people should not be too naïve.23 
 
                                                        
22 Cai, “Quanqiu Zhili de Zhongguo Shijiao yu Shijian (China's Perspectives and Practices towards Global 
Governance),” 95-96. 
23 Ibid., 96-98. 
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1.3 Governance versus Government 
The controversy of whether government has come to an end is to some extent evoked by 
the disputable title of Rosenau’s book, Governance without Government. Blair and Schroeder also 
appealed for “more governance, less government”.24 
Thomas Risse misunderstood of the term government. While believing that global 
governance is “the type of regulation typical of the cooperative state, where state and non-
state actors participate in mixed public and private policy networks”25, he expounded 
Czempiel’s opinion on governance without government as “confined to creating political 
order in the absence of a state with a legitimate monopoly over the use of force and the 
capacity to authoritatively enforce the law and other rules.”26 In “From Government to 
Governance”, Thomas Nowotny states, “in ‘government’ the ultimate and highest authority 
is either with a single institution; or this authority is divided according to the principle of a 
‘separation of powers’ between the legislature, the judiciary and the executive branch.” While 
in governance, “supreme authority is not lodged in one single institution (or in a legislature, 
and executive and a judiciary, each with clearly established functions).”27 
It should be noted that, government hereby does not refer to the narrow notion as 
dictionary suggests, a ruling organ that use force without prompting resistance of society, but 
the wider notion of the existence of institutions and laws to maintain order. 
However, when governance and the narrow notion of government are compared in terms of 
their similarities and differences, it is eminent that the functions performed be government is                                                         
24 Blair and Schroeder, “Europe: The Third Way/ Die Neue Mitte: FCPP - Frontier Centre for Public Policy.” 
25 Mayntz Renate, “Common Goods and Governance,” in Common Goods, ed. Adrienne Heritier (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 21. 
26 Thomas Risse, “Global Governance and Communicative Action,” in Global Governance and Public Accountability, 
ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Australia: Blachwell Publishing, 2005), 165. 
27 Thomas Nowotny, Strawberries in Winter: On Global Trends and Global Governance (Peter Lang, 2004), 351. 
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not adequate enough to deal with the current situation of international community. 
Firstly, both of them conduct purposive behaviors. In other words, they perform goal-
oriented activities. Their work does not only have the consequence of making decisions, but 
also check the outputs and responses of the practice of decisions, no matter whether the 
compliance is based on coercion and enforcement, say, the usual methods of governments 
with full legitimate authority, or on announcement of declarations, validation of policies and 
projects, and creation of new international regimes, which are often resorted to by 
governance toward non-compliance.28 
Secondly, both of them are referred to as systems of rule. Systems of rule not only deal with 
the distribution of property rights29, but also decide upon the distribution of all politically 
relevant values, such as security, property rights, opportunities of economic well-being, 
permanent enhancement of the systems themselves, wide spread of the idea of civil rights, 
and possibilities for participation in ruling through elections and collective determinations.30 
Apart from similarities, there are three differences that distinguish government from 
governance.31 
Firstly, government boasts formal authority, and is backed up by police power to insure the 
implementation of duly constituted policies, while governance shares goals that may or may 
not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities, and do not necessarily rely on 
                                                        
28 K. J. Holsti, “Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century Europe,” in Governance without Government: Order and Change in 
World Politics, ed. James N Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
44-45. 
29 Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Keohane 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 317. 
30 Ernst Otto Czempiel, “Governance and Democratization,” in Governance without Government: Order and Change 
in World Politics, ed. James N Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 
258. 
31 Rosenau and Czempiel, Governance without government: order and change in world politics, 5-6. 
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police powers to overcome non-compliance and gain support and compliance. Without 
being recognized full legitimacy, governance will always have to resort to non-violent means 
to overcome defiance to its decisions.  
Secondly, governance is deemed as more effective in goal achieving, and thus is accepted by 
the majority, or on some occasions, the most powerful cooperative actors. Government 
could function even when it confronts with oppositions to its decisions and policies. 
Although the government is sometimes ineffective in performing its functions, it could 
escape from being considered as weak or even non-existent by the public.  
Thirdly, there are new non-governmental actors participating in governance. As in Friedrich 
Kratochwil’s opinion, global governance is not just designed to draw attention to those 
issues that hopefully could be solved by the market, the “unseen hand”, but also “attempts 
to capture the complexity of interactions between public and private actors, between formal 
organizations and elements of ‘civil society’ that are involved in providing the ‘public goods’ 
which were formerly the exclusive domains of states”. 32  He hit the most eminent 
contradiction in the international system: the increase of global public problems versus the 
inadequate governance of existing political entities. 
Now that civil society has seen a rapid development in Western countries, it helps enhance 
transparency in domestic and transnational policy conduction and coordination, and supplies 
public goods together with private sectors with effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore, 
people could anticipate the performance of those non-governmental organizations and that 
of private sectors performance in the international system in the foreseeable future. Since the                                                         
32 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Politics, Norms, and Peaceful Chance: Two Moves to Institution,” in International 
Organization and Global Governance: A Reader, ed. Edward D. Mansfield and Friedrich Kratochwil 
(Pearson/Longman, 2006), 112-114. 
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functions and features of nation states have long been studied by international relations 
experts, the following two parts will exclusively deal with the two relatively new items, civil 
society and transnational corporations. 
Fourthly, the situation is sometimes debatable as to whether it is government without 
governance or governance without government. Government is hereby regarded as a means 
to conduct governance, though it is not such an ideal one. Governance is conceived in 
functional terms of tasks that have to be performed to sustain the “routinized 
arrangements” 33  of the prevailing order and that may or may not be performed by 
governments. Government lacks relative regulatory mechanisms to function effectively, 
whereas governance is demonstrated as the combination of intention and order, which 
guarantees that its functions could be performed effectively and efficiently. Despite the fact 
the power of nation states may be balanced by the non-governmental institutions, as 
observed by Kothari Rajhi, “Governance has been usurped by governments”34, it is unlikely 
that they should be substituted by the latter. Governance without government does not 
require the exclusion of national or sub-national governments. Instead, it does necessitate 
the inquiry that presumes the absence of some overarching governmental authority at the 
international level. Therefore, sovereign states will remain an indispensable player in 
international relations as the most legitimate institution in governing domestic affairs. 
                                                        
33 The routinized arrangements hereby refer to the trade, postal, passport procedures and likewise work. 
34 Rajhi Kothari, “On Human Governance,” Alternatives, no. 12 (1987): 277. 
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1.4 The Legitimacy Problems of Global Governance 
The concept of legitimacy has two tiers of meanings.35 From the normative perspective, it 
refers to the validity of political decisions and directives. From the descriptive perspective, 
by contrast, it refers to the societal acceptance and admission to the political decisions and 
orders. 
The legitimacy of governance, in descriptive terms is, built on trust of the compliance of the 
decisions and orders themselves. In recent years, there is a growth in demand for new types 
of supranational and transnational institutional governance36: 
Firstly, there is an increasing demand for establishment of supranational arbitration body at 
the border between different regulatory areas. Secondly, these institutions are anticipated to 
perform the function of gathering information on rule-compliance. Amnesty International 
serves as a good example of currently active organizations in this area. And finally, there is a 
growing need for gathering and distributing impartial knowledge and information on 
complex global problems.  
When the members of a political community recognize the legitimacy of the political system, 
the insufficiency of the system could be neutralized. Vis-à-vis, if a political system could 
meet the long term demand and welfare of its members, it could then attain legitimacy.37 In 
this sense, global governance as a global framework, which supplies people with low cost but 
efficient public service, and promote good interactions between the governance subjectives 
                                                        
35 Michael Zurn, “Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems,” in Global Governance and Public Accountability, 
ed. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Australia: Blachwell Publishing, 2005), 136-137. 
36 Ibid., 148-149. 
37 J. Rothschild, “Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe,” in Legitimacy of Regimes, ed. B. Benitch (Beverly 
Hill: Sage Publications Inc., 1979), 38-39. 
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and objectives38, could acquire legitimacy. 
To satisfy people’s enlarging demand, global governance institutions must enhance their 
legitimacy through contributing to democratization by improving the institutional scope for 
direct democratization and broadening the channel for global communication and 
coordination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
38 Tuo Cai and Juan Wu, “Shixi Quanqiu Zhili de Hefaxing (Legitimacy Problems of Global Governance),” in 
Quanqiu Zhili (Global Governance), ed. Jisi Wang, vol. 8, Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie (World Politics: Views 
from China) (Hong Kong: Peace Book Corporation, 2006), 46-47. 
  19 
Chapter Two Studies of Global Governance in China 
In later 1990s, as people observe globalization deeper and deeper, ideas and theories of 
global governance appears and develops progressively, and it quickly becomes a global 
discourse system. What’s more, global governance becomes a general practice among an 
increasing number of governments and international organizations, as well as numerous 
constructive NGOs. 
 Global governance is a relatively new concept. After the mid-90s of the last century, 
Chinese scholars have also paid close attention to the area of global governance. Since 2000, 
Chinese scholars’ works on global governance theory have increased gradually. One of the 
earliest and more influential researchers is Professor Yu Keping. His main publications are 
Zhili Yu Shanzhi (Governance and Good Governance), Zhongguo Gongmin Shehui De Xingqi Yu Zhili 
De Bianqian (Rise of China’s Civil Society and Changes of Governance), Zengliang Minzhu Yu Shanzhi 
(Incremental Democracy and Good Governance), Quanqiuhua: Quanqiu Zhili (Globalization: Global 
Governance) and so on. In one of his article “Quanqiu Zhili Yinlun” (Introduction to Global 
Governance), Yu has investigated in detail about the origin, causes, significance of both 
positive and negative aspects of global governance theory and its prospect of development. 
At the same time, he expresses his own understanding of governance, good governance and 
the concept of global governance theory. This article is the most frequently referred by 
China’s domestic works of the theory of global governance.39 
 
 
                                                        
39 Fenglei Sun, Quanqiu Huanjing Zhili de Zhuti Wenti Yanjiu (Studies on Main Issues of Global Environmental 
Governance) (Shandong: Shandong University, 2007), 7. 
 20 
2.1 An Overview of Domestic Works of the Theory of Global Governance 
in China 
Searching through China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI.net), the biggest digital 
academic library in China, there are 340 articles on the theory of global governance from 
1999 to the present.40 Go over these articles, Lan Jianping divide them into three categories41:  
2.1.1 Agree with the theory of global governance  
Most domestic scholars have endorsed the theory of global governance approach. They 
recognize the positive significance of global governance, and hold that global governance is 
effective in the maintenance of international political and economic order. Yu Keping 
mentioned: “Global governance is a kind of democratic consultation and cooperation to 
maximize the common interest of national governments, international organizations, and 
national citizens. And its core should be to well establish and develop a set of new 
international political and economic order, which could maintain security, safe, peace, 
development, welfare, equality and human rights for all humanity, including global rules and 
institutions for dealing with international political and economic issues.”42 Cai Tuo thinks, 
“Global governance theory is a new kind of international relations theory and analytical 
framework, in which the global cooperation model contained reflected profoundly the new 
features and new problems of international cooperation in the process of globalization.”43 
Works that supporting the theory of global governance can be basically studied separately 
according to five elements of governance, which brought forward by Yu Keping. They are                                                         
40 Till March 29, 2010. 
41 Jianping Lan, “Guonei Guanyu "Quanqiu Zhili" Lilun de Yanjiu Jinzhan: Yige Wenxian Zongshu (Domestic 
Works on Global Governance Theory),” Fujian Communist School Journal, no. 12 (2008): 70-75. 
42 Yu, “Quanqiu Zhili Yinlun (Introduction to Global Governance),” 31. 
43 Tuo Cai and Nanlin Lin, “Quanqiu Zhili: Shiying Quanqiuhua de Xin de Hezuo Moshi (Global Governance: 
A New Cooperative Model of Globalization),” Nankai Academic Journal, no. 2 (2004). 
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subject, object, values, rules or regulations and performance (that is, who governs, what to 
govern, why to govern, how to govern, and results of governing).44  
2.1.2 Oppose to the theory of global governance  
Some scholars take negative attitude towards global governance, and they also question the 
concept of global governance. They believed that although global governance reflects some 
new trends and changes of global politics and helps to understand the global political and 
economic order, the ideal society of global governance theory could only be a utopian 
fantasy community.45  
Tang Xianxing thinks global governance is a vulnerable concept.46 He says, “The concept of 
governance and recent behaviors of global governance did not change the nature of 
international politics. To evaluate it as ‘revolutionary change’ would be too naïve.” The 
idealistic global governance is not able to achieve. In this regard, Tang Xianxing continues, 
“The international community designed by global governance is too theoretical and 
idealistic. Firstly it ignores the harsh reality of the power politics’ ruling to others; and 
secondly, it has denounced the country’s role as the main regulator under the ‘anarchy’ of 
international community.” In addition, international institutions’ role declines due to its 
ineffectiveness in global governance. Tang also pointed out that “the various theories of 
global governance is neo-liberalism under the guise of idealism… the myth of Western 
Centrism and European racial superiority exposed completely in their discourse.”47 
Chen Shaofeng and Li Yonghui believe that “there are significant limitations existing in                                                         
44 Yu, “Quanqiu Zhili Yinlun (Introduction to Global Governance),” 17-18. 
45 Lan, “Guonei Guanyu "Quanqiu Zhili" Lilun de Yanjiu Jinzhan: Yige Wenxian Zongshu (Domestic Works 
on Global Governance Theory).” 
46 Xianxing Tang, “Quanqiu Zhili: Yige Cuiruo de Gainian (Global Governance: A Vulnerable Concept),” Guoji 
Guancha (International Review), 1999. 
47 Ibid. 
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theory and practice of global governance”.48 Their reasons are: first, the rise of global issues 
only shows the necessity and urgency of inter-country cooperation and global governance, 
but it is not a sufficient condition to guarantee the emergence of global governance; second, 
the dispersion of the interests and serious asymmetry in the existing system led to the 
difficulty of taking collective actions; third, certain sovereign states resist to global 
governance in varying degrees; fourth, the lack of international authority; and the last is the 
frailness of the world’s civil society.  
2.1.3 Stand neutral towards the theory of global governance  
Lin Haihong conducted on a more integrated and dialectical analysis of global governance. 
She thinks, “The development of economic globalization has strengthened the economic 
and political tie among countries. However, whether it means the state will withdraw from 
the stage of history, be replaced by the global community, or coordinate demands of all 
countries by establishing supranational government? This may possibly happen, but is 
constrained by many factors. From economic level, the establishment of market system in 
the world scale has provided global governance with economic incentives, but it has own 
defect that is hard to overcome. From political level, the development of domestic civil 
society is beyond national boundaries, and to some extends it accelerated the growth of 
international civil society. Nevertheless, developing countries still hold rejective or prudent 
attitude to the emergence of international civil society. They will not give up national 
sovereignty or let national rights be weakened. From ideological level, the pursuit of world’s 
common values play a role in international affairs, which cannot be ignored, but the national 
consciousness remains the dominant position in ideology. It is still the basic standard of                                                         
48 Shaofeng Chen and Yonghui Li, “Quanqiu Zhili Jiqi Xiandu (Global Governance and its Limitations),” 
Modern World and Socialism, no. 1 (2001). 
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making political judgments and conducts. Undeniably, global governance is the new trend 
and new phenomenon of international society’s development, but it also describes another 
side of complex phenomenon, which does not cover all its connotation.”49 
2.2 Problems of Domestic Works on Global Governance Theory  
Has been mentioned earlier, since 1999, there has been 340 articles on the theory of global 
governance in China. Putting aside the quality of these articles, in terms of quantity, we can 
see the Chinese scholars and researchers’ concerns in this area and the needs for studying in 
this area. However, Lan holds that there are still following questions in domestic theoretical 
study on global governance50: 
2.2.1 The current domestic academic field has not yet determined the concept and 
definition of global governance 
Western countries firstly study on global governance, and they still do not clarify on the 
concept of global governance till now. China is the same case. The conception of global 
governance is so complex, because it is closely related to other certain concepts, such as 
“nation,” “sovereignty,” “authority,” “governance,” “civil society” and so on. These 
concepts are being explored in political field as well, so obviously it is not so easy to sort out 
the definition of global governance.  
Yu Keping believes, “The so-called global governance refers to solve global conflicts, 
problems of ecology, human rights, immigration, drugs, smuggling, communicable diseases 
and so on through the adoption of international regimes, in order to maintain the normal 
                                                        
49 Haihong Lin, “Quanqiu Zhili Qushi Jiqi Zhiyue Yinsu (The Trends of Global Governance and Its Restricted 
Factors),” Shijiazhuang Communist School Academic Journal, no. 7 (2005). 
50 Lan, “Guonei Guanyu "Quanqiu Zhili" Lilun de Yanjiu Jinzhan: Yige Wenxian Zongshu (Domestic Works 
on Global Governance Theory).” 
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international political and economic order”.51  
Tang Xianxing states that the connotation of global governance is “governmental 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, private 
enterprises, interest groups and social activity. They together constitute a kind of political, 
economic and social regulation forms of national and international; these main actors are 
interdependent, and their goal is to reach a common position for consultations and 
negotiations. They attempt to solve the conflicts of all levels through the form of 
cooperation”.52 
Lü Xiaoli argues that “global governance means the process of a diversified, multi-level 
governance body mutually adjusting objectives, solving conflicts together and consultatively 
and cooperatively managing global affairs, in order to enhance mutual benefits. To a certain 
sense, this concept is designed for observing life of high degree of complexity and diversity 
in the world”.53 
Wang Lefu and Liu Yaping say “global governance can be seen as the management of global 
public affairs in era of globalization”.54 
2.2.2 The depth and breadth of domestic research on the theory of global governance 
are inadequate, the scope and area are narrow, and perspectives and methods need 
to be further broken through 
Although studies on global governance have addressed the five elements proposed by Yu 
Keping, many scholars have not yet fundamentally touched or answered “whether the world                                                         
51 Yu, “Quanqiu Zhili Yinlun (Introduction to Global Governance),” 17. 
52 Xianxing Tang, “Quanqiu Zhili yu Disan Shijie de Biange (Global Governance and Reform of the Third 
World),” Europe, no. 3 (2000). 
53 Xiaoli Lü, “Quanqiu Zhili: Moshi Bijiao yu Xianshi Xuanze (Global Governance: Model Comparison and 
Reality Choice),” Modern International Relations, no. 12 (2001). 
54 Lefu Wang and Yaping Liu, “Guoji Gonggong Guanli de Xin Qushi: Quanqiu Zhili (New Trend of 
International Public Management: Global Governance),” Academic Studies, no. 10 (2002). 
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can be governed in the end or not,” and “questions of world’s political life put forward by 
the debates of globalization, namely who governs, according to whose interests to govern, 
for what purpose to govern, by what means to govern” and so on.55 In addition, generally 
the overall effects of groups working on global governance has not yet formed, and few 
articles are related to the empirical study of global governance, which is the case study or 
research, etc. Therefore, the current study seems to be monotonous and without depth. In 
world’s scope, mainly in Europe and the United States, the discussions on global governance 
have reached a new level, which marked by the in-depth analysis on the impact of 
globalization to domestic governance and existing international system. Various theories and 
proposals of global governance are presented. However, researches of global governance in 
China have not come to this far. In how to seek one’s own goals, motivations, interests and 
values in global governance and the corresponding responsibility that China should bear, 
Chinese scholars’ studies are not enough. Intellection and proposal of global governance 
essentially belong to the West, or are derived from the West. Many articles and writings by 
Chinese scholars showed their great interest in the theory of global governance, but the 
overall works are introductory. Chinese scholars’ original argument of global governance, 
which has an international impact, is not much. Furthermore, China’s specific research of 
global governance organizations, system and mechanism is inadequate. 
Domestic studies on the scope and areas of global governance theory mainly focus on the 
understanding of global governance and exploration of how to launch global governance--
precisely on how to manage globalization and China's role in global governance and so on. 
But it is not enough. Works are relatively scarce on sorting out schools of global governance                                                         
55 Zhongying Pang, “Guanyu Zhongguo de Quanqiu Zhili Yanjiu (About China's Researches on Global 
Governance),” Modern International Relations, no. 3 (2006). 
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theory, and studying of the trend of global governance, international regulations and systems 
of global governance, and cultural and social cognition.  
The research methods are mostly qualitative but quantitative empirical research is almost 
zero. What’s more, most scholars start to study from perspectives of political science or 
international relations, very little from economics, sociology, history, law and other social 
science’s perspectives and methods to augment the study of global governance. 
2.2.3 Scholars are not doing enough in developing their own ideas of global 
governance 
Chinese scholars basically introduce the theory of global governance of foreign researches. 
On the one hand, some papers are written by foreign scholars, and then translated in 
Chinese and published, such as Liu Yuanqi edited “Global Governance, or Unilateral 
Hegemony?” On the other hand, there are some domestic scholars writing articles to 
evaluate foreign scholars’ ideas or works, such as Chen Liang and Chen Gang’s “Analysis on 
Gramsci’s Idea of Global Governance”. These documents are apparently not enough in 
studies and developing the theory of global governance. The research in the early stages is 
necessary and effective, but with the needs of in-depth study, only to introduce and evaluate 
is not sufficient to constitute the building of global governance in China’s academic field.56  
In recent years, China has proposed a “harmonious world” discourse. It can be seen as 
China’s national version of global governance.57 However, the concepts of harmonious 
world still should be strengthened and developed academically, and also need constant 
practice test.                                                         
56 Yunzhen Bai, “Quanqiu Zhili Wenti Yanjiu de Huigu yu Qianzhan (Retrospect and Prospect of Studies on 
Global Governance),” Teach and Research, no. 4 (2007). 
57 Zhongying Pang, “Hexie Shijie: Zhongguo de Quanqiu Zhili Zhuzhang ("Harmonious World" : China's 
Global Governance Theory),” International Herald Leader, December 29, 2005. 
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Chapter Three “Harmonious World” - Chinese Officials’ 
Perspective of Global Governance 
Facing the rise of global governance, China needs to make its own thinking and response. 
But a problem cannot be ignored is that China and Western countries bear no resemblance 
on global governance, because of the differences of developing degree, international status 
and differed history and cultural tradition. So the focus of academic, research perspective, 
and specific practice will be different.58 Some Chinese analysts state that global governance 
cannot be realized in a vacuum but should be run in a specific historical stage of the social 
environment. Therefore, they believe China needs to explore ways and means of global 
governance from its own historical culture.  
In recent years, the Chinese government’s concept of harmonious world can be seen as its 
own vision of global governance. The word “harmony” is adopted from Chinese traditional 
culture. Liu Xuelian argues that China has a long and strong history of culture, so it can drew 
historical materials for better understanding global governance and carry out certain 
knowledge innovation. In the mean time, China also needs to enrich the concept of 
harmonious world in both theoretical and practical aspects, which could make Chinese 
scholars to analyze and view problems from their own perspectives, and thus would help to 
look global governance from Chinese angle and to enrich the comprehension of global 
governance.59  
The system of global governance is a constantly advancing theory. Robert Cox said in 
“Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order”, “It is impossible to                                                         
58 Cai, “Quanqiu Zhili de Zhongguo Shijiao yu Shijian (China's Perspectives and Practices towards Global 
Governance).” 
59 Xuelian Liu, “Lun Quanqiu Zhilizhong de Hexie Shijie de Goujian (Analysis of Construction of the 
Harmonious World in Global Governance),” Jilin University Social Science Journal, no. 5 (2006). 
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predict the future; but it may be possible to construct a partial knowledge that can be helpful 
in making a future, i.e., in channeling the direction of events towards a desired option from 
among those that appear feasible. Such practical knowledge as a guide to political action is to 
be derived from an attempt to understand historical change.”60 So scholars and analysts still 
need to keep on working hard on research and development of the theory of global 
governance. 
3.1 The “Harmonious World” Theory 
The phrase “harmonious world” first officially appeared in a joint statement that the Chinese 
government issued with Russia in March 2004.61 In April 2005 Chinese President Hu Jintao 
again mentioned this concept at the Asia-Africa Conference in Jakarta. He advocated the 
spirit of openness and tolerance, respect for the diversity of civilizations, religions and 
values, respect other countries’ choice of social system and model of development, to 
promote the friendly coexistence, equality, development and prosperity of different 
civilizations, and this can be seen as the core and principle of harmonious world.62 But the 
most important landmark was Hu’s speech at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the 
United Nations in September 2005, entitled, “Strive to Establish a Harmonious World of 
Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.” It more formally and comprehensively exposed the 
thought of harmonious world. It is said that the new notion represents China’s overall goal 
                                                        
60 Robert W. Cox, “Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the 
Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. James N 
Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 139. 
61 “Joint Statement Between The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of China, April 6, 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t309361.htm. 
62 Jintao Hu, “Hu Jintao's speech at Asian-African Business Summit Reception,” Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation, April 22, 2005, http://www.focac.org/eng/zt/yf/t192832.htm. 
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and theory of global governance.63 A harmonious world is to be built on a world composed 
of sovereign nation-states that respect a plurality and diversity of cultures, ideologies and 
politico-economic systems and handle their relations on the basis of “respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, as well as respect for countries’ right to independently choose their 
own social systems and paths of development”.64 This concept was later reiterated and 
elaborated in a Chinese government white paper of December 2005 China’s Passage of Peaceful 
and Development, in Hu’s New Year Message in 2006, in Hu’s speech at Yale University in 
April 2006, and at an important foreign-policy working conference of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee in August 2006.  
The main theme of “harmonious world” discourse is to create universal development, 
common prosperity and lasting peace of the world. The theory points out how to face 
challenges of globalization, and how to grasp ideas of globalization from perspectives of 
global governance. According to harmonious world discourse, people should follow the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter, observe international law and universally 
recognized norms of international relations, and promote democracy, harmony, cooperation 
and win-win spirit in international relations. Politically, mutual respects and equal 
consultations and jointly promote the democratization of international relations. 
Economically, cooperation and complementarity, in order to promote economic 
globalization towards a balanced, universal benefit and win-win direction. Culturally, learn 
from each other, seek common ground and put differences aside, mutual respect, mutual                                                         
63 Xiaohong Lu, “"Hexie Shijie": Zhongguo de Quanqiu Zhili Lilun ("Harmonious World": China's Global 
Governance Theory),” Foreign Affairs Review, no. 92 (December 2006): 63-68; Pang, “Guanyu Zhongguo de 
Quanqiu Zhili Yanjiu (About China's Researches on Global Governance)”; Keping Yu, “Hexie Shijie yu 
Quanqiu Zhili (A harmonious world and Global Governance),” Zhongguo Tianjin Shiwei Dangxiao Xuebao (Journal 
of the CCP Tianjin Municipal Party School), no. 2 (2007): 5-10. 
64 Jintao Hu, “Build towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity (Speech 
Delivered at the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations 60th Session, New York),” People, 
September 15, 2005, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/3699888.html. 
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tolerance and mutual understanding of different civilizations, cultures, and systems, and to 
promote common prosperity of human civilizations. In security, mutual trust, strengthen 
cooperation, insist to solve international disputes by peaceful means, and to safeguard the 
world peace and stability together. China has strengthened the concept of common security, 
and insists that the United Nations is the core of the global security mechanism. 
Environmentally, help each other to jointly protect the earth of human beings.65  
3.2 Origins of Harmony 
The word “harmony” is originally from a concept of music. It means the combination of 
simultaneously sounded musical notes to produce chords and chord progressions having a 
pleasant effect. No one sound is absolutely good and every single sound does have its 
existing value and reason. However, it will turn out to be a good phenomenon only when 
one sound interacts with other opposite sound.   
Harmony is an important concept of Chinese traditional culture. For instance, Mo Zi, the 
founder of Mohism advocates for non-offense. He thinks offensive uses of force will 
generate conflicts. Taoism supports non-action and non-intervention in order to avoid 
injury. Mencius, a great Confucian thinker, thinks all wars are unjust and the great king 
should have no rivals in the world and gain supports from the masses. 
Confucians seek great harmony (Da Tong). A society of fairness, equality, mutual love, in 
which everyone has one’s own place and each performs its own functions, is the so-called 
“Great Harmonious Society” by Confucian. In Book of Rites the “Great Harmonious Society” 
is described as: “Where the world is like one home common to all; men of virtue and merit 
                                                        
65 “Hexie Shijie (Harmonious World),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 
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are to be selected to be rulers; sincerity and amity pervade all dealing between man and man; 
people shall love not only their own parents and own children, but also those of others; the 
aged, the young, the helpless widow and widowers, the orphans, the destitute, the 
incapacitated and the sick shall be well provided for and well looked after, while the able-
bodied shall exert themselves in their aid; man shall be appropriately employed and woman 
suitably married; one detests that things should be abandoned or wasted on earth, but when 
gathered or stored up, they are not to be retained exclusively for oneself; one detests that 
exertion does not proceed from oneself, but its fruits are not to be regarded exclusively as 
one’s own. Thus there will be no cause for conspiracy, robbery, theft or rebellion, and no 
need to bolt one’s outside door. That is a true Universal State.”66 Although the good 
intentions under the ancient society is lack of the possibility of realization, the implication of 
the concept of harmony has a meaningful value beyond time and space. 
Daniel A. Bell, an expert in the study of Confucian political philosophy interpreted the 
Confucian views of world order as followed: “Confucians defended the ideal of ‘tianxia’ (the 
world under heaven), a harmonious political order without state boundaries and governed by 
a sage by means of virtue, without any coercive power at all. Moreover, this harmonious 
order can and should be attained by means of benevolence and positive example, once again 
without any coercive power”.67  
3.3 Confucian Values Enter International Society 
All those traditional philosophic thoughts that constitute the backbone of China’s traditional 
culture, have a profound exposition on the concept of harmony, and view it as an important                                                         
66 Liji, Liyun (Liji, Book of Rites), nd; Jinyong Zhao, A Brief History of the Chinese Diplomatic Relations, 1644-1945 
(Chinese Culture University Press, China Academy, 1984), 32. 
67 Daniel A. Bell, “Just War and Confucianism: Implications for the Contemporary World,” in Confucian Political 
Ethics, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2008), 227. 
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values and appreciation of beauty. In a sense, harmony embodies the essential characteristics 
of China’s traditional culture. Nevertheless, in the new century, more and more people in 
China realize that the country’s economic boom does not necessarily mean good quality of 
life, or a harmonious social environment. Domestically, rapid growth of economy is taken on 
the expense of widening gap of rich and poor and devastation of environment. 
Internationally, the voice of China threat was rising. For China, in order to maintain its 
sustainable growth, she has to make the balance between economic increase and society’s 
harmony; she should nurturing business class and protect vulnerable groups at the same time 
and create a relative peaceful international environment for its own development.68 Under 
that circumstance, Chinese leaders begin to promote to build a socialist harmonious society, 
develop harmonious culture, and ask to learn from and carry forward the traditional culture 
concept of harmony and harmonious thoughts. Bell thinks that communism has lost its 
capacity to inspire the Chinese. “There is a need for a new moral foundation for political rule 
in China, and the government has moved closer to an official embrace of Confucianism.”69 
And Confucian values have been introduced into international society through China’s 
adoption of a harmonious world foreign policy perspective. 
For the spirit of Confucian thinking to reappear today in the form of harmonious world it 
can be seen as the Chinese official version of global governance and needs to be 
accommodated within the contemporary debates about global governance. 
The contemporary world, in President Hu’s words at the 17th National Congress in 2007, 
                                                        
68 Bin Yu, “China's Harmonious World-Beyond Cultural Interpretations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science Vol. 
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“remains far from tranquil.”70 He went on to note that: “Hegemonism and power politics 
still exist, local conflicts and hotspot issues keep emerging, imbalances in the world economy 
are worsening, the North-South gap is widening, and traditional and nontraditional threats to 
security are intertwined. All this poses difficulties and challenges to world peace and 
development.”71  The final destination of building a harmonious world will be the great 
harmony.  
In this point, both harmonious world and global governance are yet unborn and still in a 
formative stage. Qin Yaqing, Vice President of the China Foreign Affairs University and 
Professor of International Relations has highlighted “a major problem today is between 
demand for global governance and the conspicuous inadequacy of the global governance 
regime.”72 How, he asks, can international actors work together to deal with the transnational 
threats we face? These include climate change, pandemics, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, 
financial instability, and migration. He offers the example of the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 in drawing attention to the limitations of international financial regimes. “Reform 
is necessary,” he concludes. “This reform is not to overthrow existing regimes, but we must 
cooperate to make them suitable for today’s problems.”73 
Regard to China threat thesis noted above, in the conference paper of “The Current Mission 
of Confucianism”, Rosita Dellios wrote, “China’s emphasis on the United Nations and its 
broader multilateralism has commonly been depicted not as a sign of its cooperative 
internationalism but as a self-serving strategy for eroding US hegemony. From the global                                                         
70 Jintao Hu, Report (17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2007). 
71 Ibid. 
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governance perspective, this criticism may already be out-of-date.”74 As Weiss points out in 
regard to the US: “With power shifting, the United Nations are no longer a detour that 
delays but rather a destination that enriches U.S. options and influence.”75 
Many Chinese scholars think that the theory of harmonious world is fully consistent with the 
“UN Charter” and general aims of other international organizations. China is currently 
building a “harmonious society” in domestic, while at the international level the 
“harmonious society” would expand to the “harmonious world.” This has enriched and 
contributed to the spirits and principles of the United Nations.76 
Some Chinese analysts see China’s harmonious world concept as having much in common 
with Western theories of global governance. Lu says that governance is not government, 
while harmonious is asking for more than cooperative. So both stress on the role of 
authority rather than power. Harmonious world and global governance are in the global 
scope and both propose universalistic values.77 Cui Yanhong holds that both of them focus 
on conflicts and confrontations in the international level and the solution of these issues is 
the key of world’s peace and development. Moreover, compared to global governance 
theory, the thought of harmonious world would be more reasonable and practical.78  
When the concept of harmonious world viewed as the Chinese interpretation and                                                         
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understanding of global governance, some analysts argue that there is fundamental 
distinction between harmony and governance. Wu Xingtang points out that the West’s 
“global governance” and China’s “harmonious world” is far-fetched and should not be 
attached together. From the world’s perspective, and the relationship between international 
relations and national, we can see that “harmony” and “governance” reflects different 
philosophy. Harmony tolerates and recognizes differences and governance believes in 
common sharing values.79 
“Harmony without uniformity” recognizes and respects the world’s diversity and pluralism; 
recognizes and respects the multiformity of political system and economic system; 
recognizes and respects the variety of culture and values. Based on the recognition of 
diversity, it promotes equal dialogue, mutual consultation and learning from each other. 
In the field of international relations, to extend the contents of “harmony” means there will 
be the following points: First, to achieve harmony and co-existence under the premise of 
multi-polar international structure. Second, to take equal, mutual benefit and win-win 
situation as guide, seek harmonious development of the global economy under the premise 
of world’s economic globalization. Third, to realize harmonious progress of different 
civilizations under the premise of respecting to the diversity of civilizations. The different 
philosophical background of “harmony” and “governance” shows the fundamental 
difference of “harmonious world” and “global governance”.80 
In a harmonious world, China stresses on right of all nations to find their own way to 
develop and integrate into the global polity and economy. “China, one the one hand, rejects                                                         
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Shijie (Contemporary World), no. 12 (2007): 41-43. 
80 Ibid. 
 36 
a liberal political order imposed from the outside and, one the other hand, tries to develop 
and exercise soft power in dealing with global issues that require multilateral cooperation as 
well as recruiting support from developing countries.”81 China emphasizes the predominant 
role of the state in governance, so someone argues that key to the Chinese approach to 
global governance is for the sovereign state to use power in multilateral setting.82 In that 
case, although China becomes more and more integrated into the international system, she 
does not share much of the basic norms and rules with the West that supports global 
governance. 
3.4 How Far Has the Harmony Achieved? 
3.4.1 Google incident 
January 12, 2010, Google Inc. declared that it is subject to hacker attacks from China, and 
would negotiate with the Chinese government. Google demanded to abolish the contents 
censorship of Google China’s search engine; otherwise it would retreat from the China’s 
market. This incident drew discussions about the freedom of speech and Internet, IT 
industries, global market and even led to tensions of Sino-US relations. After more than two 
months, from March 23 onwards, Google has decided to redirect its web search, image 
search and information (news) search, which originally belonged to two domains (google.cn 
and g.cn) of Google China to the domain of Hong Kong (google.com.hk). In that way, 
Google can realize the use of uncensored search engine through the server in Hong Kong. 
However, the link of Mainland China’s users’ search for sensitive words is reset because of 
the China’s Great Firewall.  
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However, on the same day, the principal of network bureau of Information Office of State 
Council in China said it is completely wrong that Google Inc. violated the written 
commitment, stopped filtering and accused China for hacking problem. The Chinese 
government resolutely opposed to politicizing the commercial issue, and expressed its 
dissatisfaction and indignation towards Google’s accuses and behaviors.83 
The Google’s retreat cannot be view as a pure commercial issue since China’s Internet 
censorship has been implemented for a long time. Some famous international websites, such 
as Wikipedia, Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube were banned in China one after another, and 
recently Google has retreat from Mainland China to Hong Kong. If China could not 
cooperate with the international influential corporations, how can she promote the norm of 
harmony worldwide? As the harmonious world concept goes, human rights should be 
protected, and rights to information and rights of expression are fundamental rights of 
citizens. Free to use the network is the strong desire of Chinese Internet users, the network 
censorship has provoked a chorus of condemnation at home and abroad. In fact, in the era 
of information, the government can no long completely block information. Some Internet 
users use some techniques to “over the wall” in order to access to information and then 
widely spread them in a subtle way. The higher the wall, the more disappointing the users 
feel. The Chinese government asked Google to do self-censorship on certain sensitive 
information. However, apart from pornography, gambling, what else? How the government 
defines the censorship to negative but real information and news, such as mine blast, slave 
labors of black brick kiln, violent demolition, poisoned milk powder, Shanxi vaccine scandal, 
“trench oil” for cooking, etc.? Netizens cannot stand the violation of rights of accessing to                                                         
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information related to public interests. Harmonious world concept promotes tolerance and 
acceptance of all different voices. Research suggests that in complex and abstract issues, 
voices from both sides and even multi-faceted perspectives are more effective than one side. 
It can enhance immunity of citizens to the harmful information. In contrast, people, who 
live in the “ideal” information environment, once come into contact with non-mainstream 
information will be more prone to adverse and extreme reactions. 
In this Google incident, the Chinese government’s attitude is quite tough. Since the market-
oriented reform from 1980s, the booming economy makes China become more and more 
confident. The 2008 Beijing Olympics and the current Shanghai Expo further enhance the 
assurance. The author of the Penguin History of Modern China Jonathan Fendy said that 
Google’s recent dispute with China is not just about Internet censorship; it’s also about 
China’s evolving role on the world stage. The most important issue of the year may be how 
China and rest of the world learn to manage their increasingly testy relations. Fenby further 
stated, “China is in no mood to take lessons from anybody, be IT Google management, the 
Treasury Department in Washington or human rights campaigners.”84 Therefore, it could put 
difficulties in China’s cooperation with international actors and participation in global 
governance as well. 
3.4.2 Suicides in China’s factory: Foxconn 
Foxconn, the company that produces Iphone, Nokia and other famous IT brands, was 
drawn attention recently for its employees’ sequent suicides in Shenzhen. Till now, 13 
workers have committed suicide within six months at Shenzhen Foxconn. Neither the 
president’s nor the local government’s “great concern” stopped its staffs to continue to                                                         
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commit suicide. 
In fact, Foxconn workers’ death or becoming maimed after jumping out of the building is 
not an isolated incident. The reason is complicated. However, the widening gap between rich 
and the poor, aggravated feeling of powerlessness of the disadvantaged group, living 
hopeless, no rational expectation of future, lack of sense of well-being and belonging, are 
parts of the reasons that many people choose to commit suicide. 
At the beginning of this year, in the introduction of the annual Chinese New Year 
celebration, Premier Wen Jiabao gave a speech and it was the first time that he mentioned 
the word “dignity”. He declared that the government would focus on making people’s lives 
happier and more dignified. However, some media has pointed earlier that in Foxconn, work 
and sleep nearly become the whole of workers’ daily life. The company only allows half an 
hour for workers to have lunch, including queue. Working procedures have changed worker 
into an “intelligent robot” on assembly line and endless overtime is normal. There is no sign 
of dignity in their lives and it is not the harmonious society that the government advocated 
for. 
In addition, the local government should also be responsible for this incident. The amount 
of tax has become the standard of local officials to evaluate a company’s behavior. Some 
local government still protect the company even its management is poor or no concern of 
workers’ interests. 
If there are developed labor unions and trade associations in China, and corporations could 
take more social responsibilities, Foxconn workers’ suicide may not happen one after 
another. While in the world’s third largest telecom company - France Telecom - quite a few 
people committed suicide in last two years, but the reason is probably not the same as in 
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China. For China, the most important thing is to protect people’s human rights. And 
according to the democracy activist Ran Yunfei, to protect human rights, the current bad 
social system must need to reform, and there is no alternative.85 
Now Foxconn says that it will increase worker’s salary and improve the working condition. 
Hopefully this crisis can become the turning point of China’s manufactory industry. The 
focus of social and economic decision-making can change from capital-oriented to the 
priority of the value of people, especially labor priority, and workers can gain dignified labor 
rights in the construction of harmonious society in China. 
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Chapter Four History of China Joining the World 
With rapid economic development, now China is influential in many parts of the world. 
However, if going through the history, we can see China is still a new member in the 
contemporary world. From the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to 
the beginning of reforms and opening up started in 1978, China firstly focused on the 
socialist bloc and the Third World. It is only during the economic reform era that China has 
gradually joined the mainstream of international system. To analyze the history of China 
joining the world, I will go through China’s foreign policy on the process of China’s 
participation in international organizations and international system. 
4.1 Process of China’s Participation to International Organizations 
After the Second World War, especially since the end of the Cold War, international 
organizations have been growing rapidly. Their influences have infiltrated into every corner 
of the world and constituted an important carrier of global governance. Within sixty years, 
both China and international organizations have undergone a sea change. A rising China is 
involving to the world, affecting the world, and the world is also accepting and shaping 
China. This change not only reflects that China and the international community are 
adjusting and adapting each other constantly, but also reflects the evolution of China’s 
foreign policy and the re-definition of national interests. Through perspectives of China’s 
participation in international organizations and regulations, I will focus on the past six 
decades, especially in the late three decades of economic reforms. I will try to outline the 
change trajectory and sum up basic characteristics of the evolution. 
In the past six decades, the evolution of relation of China and international organizations 
can be divided into two periods, and the 1978’s economic reform is the turning point. 
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4.1.1 1949-1978: China’s trying for international recognition and restoration of 
legitimate seat in the United Nations 
In order to be recognized by international system, the newly founded China had put the 
restoration of China’s legitimate seat at the United Nations as the important goal of 
participating in international organizations. In this process, China mainly struggled with the 
United States for its legitimate seat in the United Nations. 
On November 5, 1949, former Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai called the UN 
Secretary General Trygve Halvdan Lie and the president of the 4th UN General Assembly 
Carlos P. Romulo, and solemnly stated, “The government of the People’s Republic of China 
is the sole legal government of the entire Chinese people, and it alone can represent China in 
the UN. It is the consistent position of the Chinese government that the UN must evict 
elements of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from all its organs and completely restore to the 
People’s Republic of China all its legitimate rights in the UN”.86 
On October 25, 1971, after heated debates in the 26th session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, the “23 Nations proposal” (i.e., A/RES/2758<XXVI> of the United Nations) 
was approved by 76 votes for, 35 against and 17 abstentions.87 It was adopted by an 
overwhelming majority to the restoration of the lawful rights of China in the United 
Nations. The resolution of China’s representation at the United Nations also means that the 
interaction of China and international organizations has entered into a new stage.88 
In addition to actively seek to restore its legitimate seat at the United Nations, the New                                                         
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China also tried to establish contacts and connections with a number of international 
organizations during this period. Because of the Yalta pattern of confrontation between the 
two camps, which were the US-led capitalism and the socialist Soviet Union after the Second 
World War, therefore, to a large extent, the international community is restricted to Socialist 
bloc in China’s eyes. And international organizations joint by China were mainly narrowed to 
the socialist camp as well. However, in the early 50s of last century, China had applied to 
join some international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
World Meteorological Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the 
International Labor Organization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Universal Postal Union and so on.89 
Later, with the division and restructuration of the socialist camp, China established a close 
relationship with many post-war independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. At 
that time, China’s main consideration was to establish diplomatic relations with the “Third 
World”, rather than to establish contacts with international organizations. 
After became the legitimate member of the United Nations, China has established contacts 
with the United Nations’ subsidiary bodies and participated in their activities. In 1972, China 
participated official activities in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and other organizations. In November 1973, the Chinese 
delegation attended the 17th session of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
Conference of the United Nations, and China became its member. In March 1975, China                                                         
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sent permanent delegation to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).90 At the same time, China has also established contacts with a 
number of regional organizations. For example, in May 1975, the European Community 
issued a statement that all member states of the European Community recognized the PRC 
as the sole legitimate government of China. The Community would not establish any forms 
of official relations with Taiwan. Moreover, it established formal diplomatic relation with 
China through negotiations. 91 During this period of time, the number of international 
organizations that China participated in grew from one in 1966 to 21 in 1977, number of 
non-governmental organizations increased from 58 to 71.92 
4.1.2 1979 to present: China’s reform and opening up 
In 1979, the policy of reform and opening up was set as guideline for the Communist Party 
and state. This policy greatly facilitated the development of relations between China and 
international organizations. Thus, the period of China’s participation in international 
organizations opened, both its breadth and depth were unprecedented. As a permanent 
member of UN Security Council, China began to apply for and participate in United 
Nations’ peacekeeping services. In 1988, China became a member of the Committee of 
peacekeeping operations; in January 1989, China sent five military observers to the Truce 
Supervision Organization of the United Nations.93  
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Figure 1. Chinese troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, 1990–2008 
 
Sources: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <http://conflict.sipri.org/>; and UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
‘UN mission’s summary detailed by country’, 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>. 
 
On the economic front, China has begun to join the multilateral international economic 
organizations in global economy. “China is already somewhat more integrated into the world 
economy than Japan, Taiwan or South Korea,” Nicholas Lardy points out. He believes that 
after China opened its door, the Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policies 
became far more liberal than Japanese and Korean policies when the latter two countries 
were at a comparable stage of development.94 In 1980, China became a member of IMF and 
the World Bank. It also participated in affairs of the International Agricultural Development 
Fund and the Asian Development Bank. In 1989, China became a member of Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and applied for full accession to the General Agreement on 
                                                        
94 Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute, 1994), 110. 
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986.95 
In the field of human rights, China began a broad dialogue with a number of international 
organizations. In 1979, China has participated in meetings of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, and become its members in 1982. In the non-proliferation regime, China has 
successively signed the “Antarctic Treaty” (August 1983), “Outer Space Treaty” (December 
30, 1983), “South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty” (February 1987) and so on. In 1984, 
China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and undertook to fulfill the 
obligations under the body.96 
From 1992, China begins comprehensive engagement with the international system and 
multilateral cooperation. During this period, the basic characteristics of China’s participation 
in the international system are comprehensive, strategic, and long-term. China is aware of 
involving in the international system is the important condition to break the siege and win 
for reputation of responsibility. In international community and global major issues, China 
increasingly integrates into the international system and has become more cooperative. For 
instance, China signed the “Convention on Biological and Chemical Weapons”, the 
“Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty” and so on, to accept the international 
community’s limitations for China’s development of strategic arms.97 It shows that China is 
willing to pay the price for the status of responsible power and to promote its international 
image.98 China accepted conditions for the accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and had revised the “Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China,” the “Patent                                                         
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Law of the People’s Republic of China,” and the “Trademark Law the People’s Republic of 
China”. China has enacted relevant implementation details, and maintained the good record 
of complying with the rules of the international system. Johnston pointed out that since the 
late 1970s, “China’s entry into the WTO is the clearest signal yet that officially China 
embraces the extant free trade regime”.99 However, some commentators showed doubts 
over China’s compliance record, especially in areas of intellectual property rights and market 
access. On September 3, 2002, China, who was not the signatory of “Kyoto Protocol” and 
had no obligations or targets of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, announced to ratify the 
treaty.  
While continuing its process of participating in international organizations with broader 
scope and extent, China also pays attention to neighboring areas. Taking Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 as an opportunity, China began to show the image of a responsible country 
and established close relationship with Southeast Asian countries. In December 1997, 
Chinese leaders and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) firstly decided to 
build approach of good-neighborly partnership and mutual trust in the informal meeting. In 
November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea”, which strongly impetus to the regional integration process. In November 
2002, China and ASEAN (“10+1”) leaders signed the “China-ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation”, which has fully launched the 
building process of China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. In November 2004, China and ASEAN 
signed the “Agreement on Goods Trade”, and implemented tariff reduction on July 20, 
2005. In July 2005, China and ASEAN countries signed the “China-ASEAN Free Trade 
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Area Agreement”, and presented the goal of building China-ASEAN Free Trade Area in 
2010. China and ASEAN signed the “Agreement on Trade in Services” and the “Investment 
Agreement” in 2007 and 2009. These agreements show that China and ASEAN successful 
completed the negotiating mandate of the China-ASEAN free trade area, and its building is 
in progress.100 
Also worth mentioning that in April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan officially signed the “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the 
Border Areas” in Shanghai, and the “Shanghai Five” mechanism was established.101 In 2001, 
the “Shanghai Five” mechanism developed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Meanwhile, China played an active role in the South Korean nuclear issue, developed 
multilateral diplomacy, and promoted the six-party talks to resolve the nuclear issue. In the 
process of interactions with international organizations, China’s foreign policy has been 
integrated into the multilateral diplomacy concepts. In the report of the 16th National 
Congress of the Communist Party, China made it clear that “we should be an active part in 
multilateral diplomatic activities and give full play to our role in both the United Nations and 
other international organizations.”102 
In recent years, China’s participation in the international system is stable. With gradual 
reorganization of the international system, China’s desire for further participation has 
increased. China has basically endorsed almost all international regulations in the current 
international system. To take participation in international human rights system as an 
example, China involves in all major activities of international human rights’ field, and                                                         
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several times published Human Rights White Paper.  
Above is the process of China’s participation in international organizations and international 
system. In Mao’s period, the purpose of China’s limited participation is to obtain 
international recognition, of course, firstly by the socialist countries and the third world 
countries. During Deng Xiaoping’s era or the period of economic reform, China’s 
participation in major international organizations was to create a peaceful international 
environment, and made full use of international rules and institutions to serve the national 
economy. China took international rules and systems as a tool, and steps and methods of 
China’s involvement were closely related with domestic reform and opening up. Till Jiang 
Zemin’s era, China’s comprehensive national strength has been developed greatly and China 
began to align with the international community. Meanwhile, China not only participates in 
existing international organizations with a more proactive stance, but also takes initiative to 
plan regional strategies according to international situations. A network of organizations in 
areas around China was initially established. Into the 21st century, China deeply aware that its 
own development has become an integral part of the world, and destiny of China and the 
world is closely linked together.103  
4.2 Changes of Chinese Views of the International Order and Its Place 
Therein 
Alongside China’s integration with the world’s economy and international organizations, 
China’s views of the nature of the international order and China’s place therein have 
changed. During 1950s, China saw the world as divided between the socialist and the 
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capitalist camps. Mao Zedong thinks if China wants to survive and develop, “either to 
pursue capitalism or socialism and there is no exception or the third way.”104 Finally Mao 
chose the way of firmly positioning China in the socialist camp. From the mid-1950s to the 
early 1970s, in addition to these two camps, newly independent countries and developed 
countries that differentiated from the capitalist camp had appeared. Then Mao proposed the 
theory of the three worlds—the First world of the two superpowers, the Second World of 
other developed countries, and the Third World of Asian, African and Latin American 
developing countries. As a member of the Third World, China stayed outside the 
international system and viewed the international order as injustice and manipulated by 
Western countries.  
In 1980s, with changes of international community and decline of the Soviet Union, Deng 
Xiaoping said: “The situation of Soviet-US monopoly is changing. No matter the 
international structure will be three-polar, four-polar or five-polar; the Soviet Union is always 
a pole… China should not look down upon itself and has to be one pole of the multipolar 
world.”105 From this change of view, we can see Chinese leaders take the international system 
as opportunity that China should take part and view the international system as an important 
strategic channel to reinforce China’s position. As Samuel Kim puts it, China abandoned its 
radical system-transforming approach to adopt a system-reforming and then a system-
maintaining approach.106 
Since the last decade of the 20th century, China began to view itself as a rising power and                                                         
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began to play the economic card in foreign affairs. In this way, China further established the 
strategy of advancing China’s international status by economic development. Into the 21st 
century, Chinese leaders are more objective on perceptions of international environment, 
and emphasize more on improving the status of China in Asia as a strategic base and the 
regionalism as a core mean to achieve strategic objectives.107 
With the development, China’s desire of taking international responsibility is increasing. In 
1997, the declaration of “to be a responsible power in international community”108 is a clear 
strategic announcement. It means that China’s self-identity has undergone tremendous 
change. National behavior was more and more adjusted by the international system, and 
China increasingly expects to be regarded as an active and responsible participant in the 
international system. Meanwhile, China becomes particularly sensitive to be considered as 
stubborn and isolated role. The goal of constructive and responsible international image has 
been built up during the interaction between China and the international system. 
Overall, the current international system basically meets the demands of China’s interests, so 
China is not a challenger to the international system but the positive and constructive 
participant of international system and the builder or even leader of regional international 
system. China also plays a significant role in the building of regional multilateral system in 
economic field. In occasion of the Asian financial crisis, China declared that it would not 
depreciate the RMB, withstood the pressure from weakened export competitiveness. This 
action won acclaim from surrounding countries. China begins to try to establish a 
responsible image; China proposed the initiative of the establishment of China-ASEAN Free                                                         
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Trade Area, motivated ASEAN’s full cooperation with China, Japan and Korea. China takes 
the integration of East Asia as an important strategic objective. 
4.3 Overview of China’s Current Role in International Community 
The “international system” and “international community” are not the same. A country that 
belongs to “international system” does not necessarily belong to the “international 
community”. The representative of “English School”, Professor Bull, said: “A society of 
states comes into existence when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests 
and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound 
by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of 
common institutions.”109 Since the 1970s to the present, China accomplished the process of 
joining into the international system within less than 30 years. However, if from the 
perspective of value, China is still not fully integrated into the international community.110 
One feature of globalized China is that China has established a relation of a wide range of 
materials and interests with the world. However, various frictions and conflicts of politics 
and values continue to exist. The outside world’s understanding and judgment to China is 
still with suspicion and mistrust. Pang Zhongying thinks that the root cause of these 
conflicts between China and the world is the conflict of values. Non-material value-sharing 
and symbiotic relationship have not yet been established between China and the world.111 
If China wants become a respected great power in the world, the “consensus” with the 
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world is very important and necessary. However, China’s approach to global governance 
remains fundamentally state-centric and from China’s mainstream perspective, the serious 
concern about the ulterior motives of the Western efforts to promote global governance still 
exists. 112  Therefore, China must build an aggressive, recognized and shared-value 
relationships with the outside world. It is the time for a more and more economically and 
socially globalized China to emphasize the value relations with the outside world. Global 
governance is different from global government, and China mostly focuses on 
intergovernmental organizations in managing global issues. Its supports of multilateralism 
could be viewed as means to gain benefits of economic globalization and to balance the US-
dominated global governance. In that case, China does not share the basic norms and rules 
with the West in terms of global governance.  
Domestically, according to the report by “Freedom House”, China is still evaluated as “Not 
Free” in 2009. It states that China was expected to improve the human rights condition since 
the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. However, “the Chinese government in 2008 increased 
restrictions on online writers, human rights lawyers, democracy activists, migrant workers, 
and individuals seeking to petition the central government on abuses by local officials”.113 In 
general, China’s diplomatic strategy is still economic-oriented to some extents and its 
political and legal reforms of promoting democracy lag behind China’s economic 
transformation.114 
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Chapter Five China’s Role in Global Governance 
Until recently, the Chinese have only paid certain attention to China’s integration with the 
world, namely the expansion of its membership in a variety of international and transnational 
organizations, but not given much thought to China’s role in global governance. However, 
China as a new participant in global governance could draw lessons and gain experience 
from the former successes and failures in the course of transnational governance and 
contribute to global governance.  
5.1 China’s Prudent Attitude toward Global Governance  
Several factors have contributed to China’s prudence in its involvement into global 
governance. First and foremost, China is still a new player on global arena and is a rising 
power in the world, and Chinese government lacks knowledge of the existing rules and 
mechanisms of various international regimes. Therefore China maintains a low profile in 
dealing with world affairs and taking part in multilateral activities.  
In addition, in the shadow of the so-called “China threat”, Chinese leaders were very 
cautious and reluctant to take an active position on many international issues. They tried to 
emphasize that China’s rise was and would continue to be peaceful and carried out several 
cooperation with other Asian neighboring countries. However, some Chinese scholars argue 
that with the continued growth of economy and deeper integration into the international 
system, China should change its prudent attitude and low-profile position. The strategy of 
“hiding one’s capacity and biding for time to develop” (Tao Guang Yang Hui) is no longer 
viable and China must consider what role it should play in the world.115 
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5.2 A Hundred Years of Humiliation and National Sovereignty 
As a developing country, which has won full independence from imperialist states, China 
treasures sovereignty and protects the right to deal with domestic affairs independently. 
While participating in global governance is in China’s national interests, Cai states that since 
Chinese participation has been “in the name either of the government or of the state”116, so 
for China there is little difference between global governance and international government. 
He continues that developing countries, being relatively novices in the architecture of global 
governance, are apprehensive of both Western developed nations and global civil society 
because of the challenges they pose to the state as well as national sovereignty.  
Why China is so sensitive and so much concerns with national sovereignty? The idea of 
Bainian Guochi (100 years of national humiliation) could explain. Starting with China’s defeat 
in the Opium Wars in the mid-nineteenth century and the humiliated treatment of Chinese 
migrants in the United States, “a particularly important element in the formation of China’s 
modern identity has been the legacy of the country’s ‘humiliation’ at the hands of 
foreigners”.117 It was only till the end of the Second World War, the New China was founded 
and had overturned the “three big mountains”, namely imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucratic capitalism. As Mao Zedong famous declaration goes that China will no longer 
be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. Chinese people had stood up. However, the 
sense of victims has not faded over times but it is still lingering on Chinese’ mind. The 
national humiliation narrative is still reproduced in textbooks, museums, movies, journal and 
exhibitions. Moreover, strong emotion of anti-Japan is still prevailing among many Chinese                                                         
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people. References to “the ‘Century of Humiliation’…both reflect and powerfully shape 
China’s relations with the West today,”118 writes Peter Gries. “By evoking the people, events, 
and symbols of China’s early modern encounter with the West, Chinese continually return to 
this unresolved trauma….”119 However, “feelings of humiliation live on,” he concludes. 
“Neither Communism’s victory over the Nationalist Party in the Civil War, nor the 
declaration of ‘Liberation’ in 1949 appears to have exorcised the past.”120 
In the past, China was weak and poor, so many parts of land were lost and its rights were 
violated by foreign powers. Now, China is rising and gaining power, therefore it can no 
longer stand separation of any parts of China or issues of interference in national sovereignty.  
The theme of victimization could construct collective identity in order to keep foreign forces 
at bay. The priority of sovereignty still weights heavily in the Chinese official view, and to 
restore China’s territorial integrity is one of their dreams. In Chinese people’s eyes, China is a 
multiethnic country with Han (central Chinese), Man (Manchurians), Meng (Mongolians), Hui 
(Muslims), and Zang (Tibetans) and China should reunify all lands, which have been broken 
away by imperialist powers during the times of China’s weakness. Therefore, China insists on 
“sovereignty priority” on issues of Taiwan, let alone Xingjiang and Tibet. 
Global governance inevitably put challenges to the concept of national sovereignty, which 
China understands. Moreover, it contradicts to China’s strong attachment to national 
sovereignty that grew out of the “100 years of humiliation” from the mid-nineteenth to the 
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mid-twentieth century. Any governance arrangement that might reduce state sovereignty will 
be difficult for China to contemplate.121 
5.3 State’s Stability and Economic Growth 
Since the late 1980s economic reform and opening up, China’s economy grows rapidly and 
becomes the second largest economic entity in the world. However, the robust growth is 
achieved at the expense of income equality and the environment. Besides the huge economic 
gap between countryside and urban, the gap between different cities or even within one city 
is widening as well. The inequality does not only reflect in income, but also in education, 
healthcare, social welfare, and so on. Imbalanced distribution will bring chaos in the society. 
In consequence, to keep the state’s stability and make the monopoly of power unchallenged 
are big concerns of CCP. It is understandable that social stability is very significant to a state, 
particularly a state like China, with 1,4 billion population and 55 ethnic minority groups. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese elites recognizes that global governance would blur the distinction 
between international and domestic politics and some of them are cautious that global 
governance may open the door to foreign interference in China’s domestic affairs and 
undermine its political stability.122 While attempting to shoulder more responsibilities, some 
Chinese analysts suggest that the Chinese government should also be alert and prevent some 
western conspiracy of anti-China propaganda and actions. Even today, after 20 years from 
the end of the Cold War, some western forces have not yet given up some kind of 
conspiracy of peaceful transformation. China’s participation into global governance should 
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never at the expense of national security and social stability. So it is necessary that the 
Chinese government first find out the true intention of its cooperators. To them, there is 
always the danger that Western powers will use global governance as pretext to pose threat 
to CCP’s regime.123 
 In consequence, if China’s participation in global governance puts challenges to the 
communist regime, such as issues of Xingjiang or Tibet, freedom of press, internet 
censorship and AIDS epidemic, the Chinese government would dampen its enthusiasm for 
involvement in global governance or even might not be willing to take part in it anymore. 
5.4 Does China Embrace Good Governance Practices?  
5.4.1 Responsibility to protect 
In dealing with foreign relations, China still takes the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence”124, which was formed in 1954, as one of its main diplomatic strategies. In 2005, 
on the report by the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change entitled “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility”, China emphasizes that 
the rights and responsibilities of sovereign states should be respected. It argues that it is 
inadvisable to make hasty judgment that the State concerned is unable or unwilling to 
protect its own citizens and rush to intervene and believes that there must be strict respect 
non-interference and disagrees with the 5 criteria for use of force on principle.125 
China has affirmed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and issued corresponding 
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statements in favor of bolstering the UN’s capacity. However, in the government’s Position 
Paper on the United Nations Reforms in 2005, it shows China’s understanding about the 
norm of “responsibility to protect”. China maintains that each state shoulders the primary 
responsibility to protect its own population. However, internal unrest in a country is often 
caused by complex factors. Prudence is called for in judging a government’s ability and will 
to protect its citizens. Even if a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, the opinions of the 
country and the regional organization concerned should be respected.126 In addition, “China 
remains persistently averse to non-consensual force and is reticent to apply sanctions, 
particularly when these measures are not fully backed by relevant regional organizations.”127 
In Chinese academic community, the notion of “responsibility to protect” is not given 
certain attention on national literatures either and humanitarian intervention is also viewed 
with much suspicion. Gao Feng, one of the editors of the Chinese Yearbook of International 
Law, takes issue with the proponents of humanitarian intervention over the double standard 
of intervention.128 And “he concludes that global governance would be possible only if the 
principle of sovereign equality is closely observed.”129 When the “responsibility to protect” is 
tested by issues of Darfur or Myanmar, China’s actions are disappointing. “It does not align 
itself with the West in attaching the political conditionality of good governance to its 
commercial deals and its financial assistance to less developed countries, particularly those in 
Asia and Africa which have notorious human-rights records.”130 
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5.4.2 Economic interested oriented: cases of Sudan and Myanmar 
China’s “no strings attached” foreign policy, which excludes political issues from the 
enthusiastic economic cooperation between the two sides, neglected existing problems 
among some African regimes, which the West deem as “rogue” nations that are corrupted, 
authoritarian and irresponsible for the prevailing civil wars that kill hundreds of thousands. 
Western analysts accuse China of undermining the efforts to promote democracy, human 
rights and good governance in the world’s poorest continent. In this scenario, China’s stance 
on several issues, especially the Darfur crisis, takes the main brunt of the attacks from the 
West. For instance, the Chinese permanent membership in the United Nations Security 
Council has offered protection to the Sudanese government against the imposition of 
sanctions over Khartoum’s action in Darfur. Moreover, criticisms also come to China’s 
military exports to Sudan, which fuel the conflicts in the chaotic region.131 
Sudan is in list of the top worst government by Freedom House and was called one of the 
worst dictatorship governments in the world by Parade magazine. This country excluded 
other foreign countries and rejected United Nations’ supervision of its human rights 
situation. Sudanese government supported for genocide against the people in Darfur. The 
United States had taken sanctions to Sudan, in the meantime, China’s influence has 
infiltrated in its many aspects. China has become Sudan’s largest investor and the biggest 
purchaser of its resources. At the beginning, China supplied arm forces to Sudan, and then, 
tens of thousands of migrant workers flew into there. 
China has been criticized for its unfair trade with the Sudan, as China is the largest investor 
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in Sudan’s oil industry and its largest customer, taking approximately 80 percent of its output 
and owning a 40 percent stake in the major oil consortium drilling in Sudan.132 It could be 
argued why China tries to maintain good relationship with Africa is because 10 percent of 
the world’s oil is produced on the Africa continent annually. Therefore it is not surprising to 
hear criticism over China’s role in Africa, “The last decade has seen China sweep across 
Africa in search of raw materials to fuel its booming economy. Having invested in more than 
27 oil and gas projects in some 14 African countries, China’s attention fell on … oil 
reserves,” writes Foreign Affairs correspondent Mary Fitzgerald.133 China has been blamed 
for deteriorating Sudan’s political situations as China repeatedly blocked attempts of the 
United Nations to punish Sudan for failing to stop atrocities in its Darfur region. In 2008, 
from French Presidential candidates to Hollywood celebrities to Australian college students 
increasingly had been made for a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games. 
Then come to the case of Myanmar, China had vetoed a 2007 draft Security Council 
resolution on Myanmar on the grounds that violent repression in Myanmar was not a threat 
to international peace and security. According to International Coalition for Responsibility to 
Protect, “much more needs to be done to engage reluctant actors, such as China and Russia, 
and to unify the international community of states behind policies to engage, and put 
pressure on, the government to fulfill its responsibility to protect the people of Burma 
(Myanmar).”134 
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Myanmar is rich in oil storage capacity, and the basic control of its oil exploration rights is in 
the hands of China. According to Chinese domestic media reports, China National 
Petroleum Exploration and Development Corp. signed a formal contract with the Myanmar 
Oil and Gas Company in Yangon. China gained the right of oil and gas exploration in 
Myanmar’s three deepwater blocks. China’s three major corporations, including China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), have fully launched their 
oil projects in Myanmar. This can explain China’s supportive attitude towards Myanmar 
military junta. Shwe Gas Movement, a human rights organization in Myanmar, wrote an 
open letter to the government of China on October 28, 2009 to express its grave concerns of 
China’s planned construction of 980km natural gas and oil pipeline corridor from western 
Myanmar to Yunnan province in China. This pipeline will bring oil and gas of Middle East 
and Africa from Myanmar to China. The human rights organization estimated that this 
investment would bring 29 billion US dollars to the Myanmar military junta in coming 30 
years. 
In fact, when China declares non-interference into other countries’ internal affairs, its 
economic cooperation, trades and investments do influence in many aspects of a country. 
Politically unconditional aid might encourage repressive governments to sustain a policy of 
corruption and human rights violations, and whether the local population will really profit 
from the investments is in question. Economically, some countries urgently need money for 
reconstruction, but a heavier debt burden can again hamper the reconstruction process. 
However, on the one hand, at least China is doing something visible in Africa, something                                                         
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might help poor countries to some degree. Serge Mombouli, a longtime adviser to Congo’s 
president, says the West pushes for intangible achievements like better government, while 
China supports tangible things. “Tangible development means you can see, you can touch,” 
Mombouli continues, “We need both. We cannot be talking just about democracy, 
transparency, and good governance. At the end of the day the population does not have 
anything to eat, does not have water to drink, no electricity at night, industry to provide 
work, so we need both. People do not eat democracy.”135 Mauro de Lorenzo, a research 
analyst at the very conservative think tank of the American Enterprise Institute, pointed out 
Chinese are doing profitable business, but westerners are blinded in the view of 
humanitarian. However, humanitarian is also a trick of controlling: it maintains a kind of 
relationship of dominance. He mentioned that the story of Africa in western world, it all 
derived from Heart of Darkness of Joseph Conrad. It was about massacre, horrible diseases, 
rape and genocide. The most terrible thing is that one can force the other one to obey. On 
the contrary, he said, “Chinese do not have this kind of ideas, and they just make their 
money here. It made our view opened and we followed it, because humanitarian brings 
harmfulness.”136 
On the other hand, to create a sound environment for development is very important to 
China since she has lots investments, companies and workers in other Asian and African 
countries. Therefore, China will also put efforts on making the society stable and security. 
Chaos and large scale of insurrections will cause China’s interests suffered.  
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5.5 Chinese Intellectual History – “Guanxi” 
Since the French revolution, individual rights and freedoms had been spread out. 
“Autonomy, individualism, and the rights of a legal personality were concepts that created 
both the sociology of citizens in society and the political sociology of states in an 
international system.”137 However, the Chinese culture ranks very low on individualism, but 
scores very high on collectivism. In the meantime, Gannon argues that Chinese culture 
should be better characterized as relational, rather than individualist or collectivist.138 A web 
of relations in Chinese is called “guanxi”. Recently, the Chinese term “guanxi” frequently 
appears in English popular and academic writings. The word “guan” can be translated as 
referring to a “juncture”, a “conjunctive point which connects otherwise separate entities”.139 
And “xi” means to tie up. Chen and Chen defines “guanxi” as “an indigenous Chinese 
construct and define it as an informal, particularistic personal connection between two 
individuals who are bounded by an implicit psychological contract to follow the social norm 
of guanxi such as maintaining a long term relationship, mutual commitment, loyalty, and 
obligation”.140 “Guanxi” can describe relations between individuals, and in the Chinese 
international relations, it is also a different form. Gold views “ ‘guanxi’ as typifying the 
purely instrumental and particularistic dimension of interpersonal relationships, which 
contrasts with the affective and expressive dimension of friendship on one hand and the 
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universalistic, equality oriented dimension of comradeship on the other.”141 
The base of “guanxi” can be various and the most common one is kinship and family. The 
“guanxi” base can consist of contemporaneous experiences as well. In terms of relationship 
between China and the so-called “The Third World” - Asian, African and Latin American 
countries, both of them were invaded by imperialist powers, suffered from colonialism and 
became independent after continuous fights and struggles. This sense of similarities makes 
China feel closer with other countries and have to meet their demands to some extents.  
According to Chen and Chen, there is another type of base that was called anticipatory 
bases, which has received little attention. It is future oriented and becoming more and more 
important. If two countries do not share similar experience or history in common, “guanxi” 
can also be initiated by “creating potential future bases through expressing an intention or 
even a promise to engage in future exchanges, collaborations, or joint ventures”.142 This kind 
of “guanxi” can be formed by interactions. Of course, these different types of bases are not 
mutually exclusive. 
One of the significant principles of operating “guanxi” is reciprocity. Besides people should 
help those who have helped them, which seem to be universal, there are some particular 
features of reciprocity in China. First, “because ‘guanxi’ is the cornerstone of the Chinese 
society, reciprocity of favor exchanges is the most pervasive rule guiding Chinese social and 
economic interactions”. Second, reciprocity in China stresses “a long-term orientation”. It 
means the response or return does not necessarily be immediate in most cases. Third, “what 
is reciprocated must be indeed of great value to the receiver”. And the last feature of                                                         
141 Chen and Chen, “On the Intricacies of the Chinese "Guanxi": A Process Model of Guanxi Development”; 
Thomas B. Gold, “After Comradeship: Personal Relations in China since the Cultural Revolution,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 104 (December 1985): 657-675. 
142 Chen and Chen, “On the Intricacies of the Chinese "Guanxi": A Process Model of Guanxi Development.” 
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reciprocity is “its unequal exchange”.143 It always happens that the receiver returns more than 
he/she has received, especially for the richer party.  
For instance, China’s aids and trade agreements with lots of benefit to African countries, is 
an expression of “guanxi”. “Guanxi” creates obligations for continued exchange of benefits. 
China might not ask for immediate or equal return, but builds a way or base for future 
relationship. Chan states that “Chinese international political sociology becomes a series of 
interactions and it is each action that propose a balance… the number of reciprocities, not 
the weight of alliances, determines the Chinese sense of satisfaction with their international 
relations.”144 
5.6 Lack of Non-State Actors 
Global governance aims at cross-border cooperation and coordination, and encourages 
institutions like NGOs and civil society, which may or may not attain full legitimacy and 
authority to share responsibility with governments. Its form of cooperation, which lets states 
and non-state actors participate in mixed public and private policy networks, has to some 
extent confronted with the traditional mentality to protect sovereignty of developing 
countries.  
The role of China’s NGOs, companies, private sectors, civil society and individual is still 
limited in global governance. Unlike the international governance, the role of government 
alone is not enough in global governance. NGOs and civil society are equally important.  
China has implemented the opening up policy to the world for less than three decades. She 
used to adopt a relatively conservative attitude towards newly emergent non-governmental                                                         
143 Ibid. 
144 Chan, “A Chinese Political Sociology in Our Times.” 
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activities. Local NGOs and civil society in China are to some extent disconnected with the 
international NGOs and global civil society. Their size, amount, capacity, accountability, and 
the ability to influence social conventions are quite limited in comparison with their 
counterparts in Western countries and even some developing countries such as India. The 
scope of governance is more at the national level. Now it seems that the Chinese 
government (mainly central government) is the principal actor on behalf of China’s 
participation in global governance. However, how to make China’s NGOs and civil society 
play important roles in global governance, is one of the key factors of whether China will 
succeed in playing the role in global governance finally. 
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Chapter Six China’s Future Opportunities under Global 
Governance Framework 
In line with the needs of global governance, which emphasizes on equity, coordination and 
cooperation, self-regulation, and network management, Chinese government has tried to 
develop multiple ways to achieve its goals, rather than traditional hierarchic management, 
monopoly on decision-making, and coercive enforcement on the execution of directives and 
orders. Decision makers have begun to weigh more and more on negotiation and 
coordination on multi-levels and voluntary participation.  
In transferring part of authority from government to governance, from being confined to 
the national territory to going beyond the national border, Chinese government has let in 
NGOs, international civil society and global advocacy network, and has signed up treaties on 
environmental protection, anti-landmine, and standardization, such as ISO9000 on quality 
management.145 
What’s more, social networks in different subject areas have replaced the single top-bottom 
interaction between actors from higher and lower levels. Instead, decisions are to be made 
“among a varied array of public, semi-public and private actors in a global policy network”.146  
China’s approach to global governance tries to focus on major global issues, such as poverty, 
AIDS, and environmental pollution. These kind of issues are typically global and of public 
good. Through participation in the settlement of these issues, China will be exposed to the 
whole process of communication, cooperation, negotiation, and coordination with other 
governmental and nongovernmental actors. Throughout this process, Chinese government                                                         
145 Cai, Quanqiu Zhili he Zhongguo Gonggong Shiwu Guanli (Global Governance and the Management of China's Public 
Affairs), 5-6. 
146 Peter Newell, “Campaigning for Corporate Change: Global Citizen Action on the Environment,” in Global 
Citizen Action, ed. Micheal Edwards and John Gaventa (London: Earthscan, 2001), 200-201. 
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establishes a platform for actors from multi-levels to set agenda and contribute feasible 
solutions together. The global issues, especially those related to security, environment, drugs 
and diseases, have been solved with multilateral efforts, whereas before 1980s they were 
approached either under unilateral actions or had hardly drawn attention from the Chinese 
central government.147 Moreover, these issues are less complicated and sensitive than issues 
like human right and international terrorism, and are less likely to provoke conflict and 
ideological contradictions among different actors. Without causing a variety of debates and 
disputes, and making the status quo more complex and involved with worries on legitimacy 
and etc., choose the above mentioned issues will soon have consequences, and thus 
encourages Chinese government to stick more focus, courage, and confidence to global 
governance.  
In addition, education on citizens in order to cultivate analytical skill and waken the 
awareness to take part in global governance is another important issue. Chinese government 
is now promoting citizens to join in the self-regulatory committee at neighborhood level. On 
one hand, this has enhanced the level of self-regulation and the analytical skill of individuals. 
On the other hand, government facilitates democratization on grass-root level of the society, 
which in turn leads to increasing demand for democracy of higher level.  
 
 
 
                                                        
147 Changhe Su, “Zhoubian Zhidu yu Zhoubian Zhuyi: Dongya Quyu Zhilizhong de Zhongguo Tujing 
(Peripheral System and Peripheral Doctrine: China in Regional Governance of East Asia,” in Quanqiu Zhili 
(Global Governance), ed. Jisi Wang, vol. 8, 8 vols., Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie (World Politics: Views from 
China) (Hong Kong: Peace Book Corporation, 2006), 431-454. 
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Conclusion: China’s Political Willingness, Capacity and Future 
Contribution to Global Governance 
Whether China has the pol i t i ca l  wi l l ingness  to  part i c ipate  in g lobal  governance? 
One of Mao Zedong’s famous quotes in the mid of last century is: “China is a country with 
9,6 million square kilometers of land and six hundred million people, so she should make a 
greater contribution to humanity. But such a contribution, in the long past period, is too 
little. It makes us feel ashamed.”148 There is no doubt that China has the political willingness, 
intention and motivation to participate in global governance. This sense can be summarized 
as follows149:  
First, China is a maintainer of the today’s international order, while China also seeks, or tries 
to shape the future’s global order. China is working to safeguard the international order that 
on behalf of the United Nations and objectives and principles of the “UN Charter”. China is 
already a part of the international system, which is the insider of the system, rather than 
complete outsider like what it was before 1980s, so China has no reason not to maintain this 
order. Moreover, China has made many contributions to the current international system. 
For example, Chinese officials put forward a series of new international concepts, such as a 
“responsible state” (during 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis), “new security concept” (1999), 
and “effective multilateralism” (2004). China’s President Hu Jintao gave a speech on “Strive 
to Establish a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity” at the summit 
meeting of the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations, in which formally proposed the 
idea of “harmonious world”. China chooses and pursues regionalism as a new way of dealing                                                         
148 Zedong Mao, “Jinian Sun Zhongshan Xiansheng (To Commemorate Sun Yat-sen),” in Mao Zedong Xuanji 
(Selected Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1997), 311-312. 
149 Pang, “Zhengzhi Yiyuan, Guojia Nengli he Zhishi Juese-Guanyu Zhongguo zai Quanqiu Zhili zhong de 
Zuoyong (Political Willingness, State Capacity and Intellectual Role-About China's Role in Global 
Governance).” 
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with Asian countries. China endeavors to understand and accept multilateralism, change the 
past incorrect and negative attitude to multilateralism, and actively promote multilateralism.  
Second, China began to carefully explore how to shape the new world order under 
globalization. In the current international order, after all, due to lack of real influences, China 
still continue to believe that there is somehow injustice and unreasonable in this order. 
Therefore, in the long term, China will inevitably have to seek further changes in the 
international system.  
However, these self-willingness, desire, attempt, intention and motive are still subject to the 
following long-term factors. 
First, the growth of national strength does not necessarily lead the immediate change of the 
state’s position in the international system. China’s rise is difficult to transform smoothly 
into international influence, that is, the ability to participate in global affairs. China still 
believes that the current international system is basically controlled by the United States and 
Europe. China feels undemocratic of the international system and requires the 
democratization and democracy of international relations. 
Second, since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has been particularly worried and 
concerned about the so-called “China threat” from major Western countries and some Asian 
countries. China is very careful to handle (including rebuttal, explanation, etc.). In this case, 
if taking more responsibility in the world, China fears “China threat” will be strengthened. 
Third, since the end of the Cold War, China’s overall diplomatic strategies are 
TaoGuangYangHui. There are many different interpretations on the so-called 
TaoGuangYangHui. One of the common understandings is “not show off one’s own power 
and influence, keep low profile in the international community, do more and talk less, do not 
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involve in trouble, but the aim is to bide time for further development”.150 In these years, 
with accession to various international organizations and focusing on multilateral diplomacy, 
many Chinese people are beginning to talk about the rise of China, or even have different 
views on TaoGuangYangHui. However, many domestic analysts think that this strategy cannot 
be changed shortly, because China is still in a weak position in the world today, while the 
survival wisdom of the weak one is “never claim leadership”.151 Some Chinese foreign affairs 
strategists said China should adhere to TaoGuangYangHui strategy for long run.152 
Fourth, the concept of national sovereignty is still dominant in China. Although China has 
been a part of the global economy thoroughly, politically, China still very much adheres to 
the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference under the “UN Charter”. To some 
extents, it constrains the willingness of China to participate in global governance. 
Fifth, in terms of identity politics, ethnic identity and nationalism rather than regional 
identity, global identity, or internationalism still play the leading role in China. Of course, the 
regional environment in East Asia or Asia is almost the same case, like the upholding and 
strengthening of national identity in other East Asian countries (especially Japan and South 
Korea).153 In China, national interest, national strength, balance of power and so on are 
dominating the thoughts of China’s international politics. 
 
                                                        
150 English translation of TaoGuangYangHui is conceal our capacities and bide our time. 
151 See China’s 24 Character Strategy by Deng Xiaoping: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with 
affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim 
leadership”. 
152 Jianmin Wu, “Zhongguo Yao Changqi Jianchi Taoguangyanghui Yousuozuowei Fangzhen ( China should 
adhere to principles of "Conceal our capacities and bide our time" and "Accomplish something to some 
extent"),” Chinanews, June 1, 2009, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2009/06-01/1713676.shtml. 
153 Takashi Inoguchi, “Governance Across Borders in Northeast Asia: Shaping and Sharing Identities, Ideas, 
Interests and Institutions,” Global Communications Platform-Japanese Institute of Global Communications, March 3, 2003, 
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Does China have the abi l i ty  to  part i c ipate  in g lobal  governance? 
To successfully play the role in global governance, the actors involved must have sufficient 
capacity, and this is a very critical issue. China’s economy has been developing rapidly over 
the past 20 years. Under the peaceful conditions, China chooses the way of “economic 
construction-centered” in order to further enhance comprehensive national strength. This is 
laid an objective material foundation for China’s participation in global governance. 
Nevertheless, China still faces problems with capacity building in participation in global 
governance. 
Generally China still is a developing country that economy, society and human are in a low 
level of development. China itself has been the object of international governmental 
organizations and international non-governmental organizations’ aid 154 ; the task of 
modernization and development is far from completing. China has to use the major part of 
the increment of its national strength to solve domestic problems rather than solving the 
problem of global issues. 
China has paid attention to hard power for a long-term and neglected soft power. In the past 
30 years, the economic construction-centered growth mainly led to the development of 
China’s hard power, which is a tangible and physical force. But the invisible and intangible 
force of soft power, such as knowledge, innovation, national morale, morality, concept, 
strategy, diplomatic skills do not grow correspondingly. 
China’s economy relies heavily on foreign trade, foreign investment and external resources. 
That means that China’s economy is driven by foreign trade and foreign investment 
                                                        
154 Till the 21st century, China had been out of the list of aiding countries of World Bank and other 
international economic organizations. 
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somehow. China is the world factory and provides production base for global multinational 
companies. The main benefits China gains from the global trade are limited to employment 
and government revenue. 
Economic growth does not necessarily mean social development. In some cases, one-sidedly 
emphasizing on economic growth, or promoting economic development on expense of 
social development, would make social development stagnate or even decline. In the past, 
during rapid economic growth period, China witnessed a series of serious social problems, 
such as the huge gap between rural and urban, western and eastern region. What’s worse, 
this gap will continue existing in the foreseeable future and this problem is difficult to solve 
fundamentally. Moreover, large cities and super-large cities with very rapid pace of 
modernization in eastern part (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, etc) suffer from extremely 
serious “urban disease”, such as crime, pollution, unemployment, and other very significant 
problems in developing process. China has paid the price of enormous ecological and natural 
resources for development and modernization. China’s environment shows the trend of 
long-term deterioration, resulting in a growing number of serious social, political and 
international problems. 
Non-state actors, especially NGOs is lacking in China. For Chinese officials, currently China 
has to deal with economic development, state building and tries to keep the society stable. 
Therefore, the state needs to play the leading role in global governance. And all other non-
state actors are required to support and coordinate themselves with the state in order to 
make all actors as a whole while facing to the outsiders.  
Last but not least, China promotes international multilateralism, but there is a serious 
shortage of human resources that could really take part in multilateral diplomacy. Almost the 
  75 
whole Chinese are learning English and languages of other developed countries, just like in 
1950s, the whole country learned Russian. However, in terms of other countries, especially 
Asian and African countries, their language, religion, social, historical, ethnic and national 
research have not been given due attention. China is lack of professionals, who in-depth 
know in neighboring countries, like Afghanistan, Iran or India, let alone the number of 
qualified research personnel of African or Central American studies. 
Although with many universities and research institutions, it is still doubtful whether China 
can become a provider of concepts, rules, projects, values and ideas, which global 
governance needs.  
Till now, China is not the knowledge production center of the world, but the consumer 
country of mainly Western-based knowledge products. In the global knowledge structure, 
China is basically in an inferior position. China’s universities are, as matriculation of Western 
higher education system in general, and the most outstanding Chinese young people prefer 
universities in the United States and Europe to pursue their further studies. China’s own 
colleges and universities have not yet been international, and the so-called internationalized 
universities, in fact, become subsidiary body of famous Western university, namely, partner 
of Western universities, who want to access to Chinese higher education market.  
China’s understanding of globalization still remains in the stage of “making profit”, or views 
globalization mainly from perspective of interests. Knowledge and demands of globalization 
are very little. University’s courses, public opinion and mass media often concentrate on 
national interest, balance of power, national sovereignty, national security, and relations with 
powers, rather than on global issues, global threats, or global governance. 
China’s knowledge system is losing creativity, which leads to constantly desire of 
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“independent innovation”. In order to keep up with Western knowledge system, China 
desperately introduces Western scientific knowledge. This kind of open and learning may be 
necessary and inevitable in the very beginning, however, that makes China to become a 
country that only can study, understand and digest from others, even imitates the concept of 
others countries without innovation or its own understanding of world issues.  
In general, China’s capacity in global governance is inadequate. China urgently needs to 
strengthen the capacity building of global governance. 
How does China make a greater  contr ibut ion to g lobal  governance? 
First, in accordance with general ideas of governance, if China could govern itself well, it is 
already a contribution to global governance. China’s domestic governance is an important 
component of global governance. China itself accounts for one fifth of the world’s 
population. With large land area, she has a decisive influence on development of East Asia, 
Central Asia, South Asia and North Asia. Since China has become economically open and 
socially gradually open, her domestic governance no longer only has a narrow meaning, and 
she will closely integrate with the global governance. Economically, China can improve the 
efficiency of resource use, and reduce dependence on international resources. 
Environmentally, it can strengthen domestic environmental standards, reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, pay more attention to sustainable development between economy and society, 
and do its utmost to protect the global environment. Intellectually, China should produce 
global knowledge, values, concepts and standards step by step, and provide more Chinese-
style proposals for global governance. These would be contributions to global governance. 
However, to properly deal with domestic affairs, China just assists global governance, which 
means China only plays a supporting role in global governance. Beyond China’s domestic 
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governance, despite the limitations of capacity, China is still able to play a greater role in 
global governance. It is necessary to combine China’s political willingness of participating in 
global governance, accumulated governance capacity and sharing knowledge, ideas, and 
values that consistent with the international community together, and transform it into 
China’s global relations. 
China should bring forward more specific, actionable principles, recommendations and 
proposals in global governance, and give full play to specific role in the United Nations, the 
United Nations system and reforms of international economic organizations. 
Regional governance is an important intermediate link in global governance. Governance in 
Asia, particularly East Asia, is part of global governance that needs to improve. China should 
further promote the integration of the Asian region, and strengthen cooperation in Asia. In 
this process, China should not be overly worried about the so-called “China threat” theory 
from some US political conservatisms and strategist. China has to play as a responsible 
leader in integration of Asian regions. Moreover, China-based NGOs, civil society, and even 
individuals who have ability and willingness, should be encouraged to participate in global 
governance activities. 
As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China’s role is very 
important in safeguarding world peace and regional peace. China needs to consider how to 
better prevent and overcome the global and regional crisis. In “peace-maintaining” and 
“peace-building” operations of the United Nations, China could further strengthen its 
impact. 
China’s environmental problems will continue to put pressure on the world’s environment. 
China needs to stick to sustainable development. To improve environmental standards is a 
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sign of modernization, and also makes a greater effort the health of the global ecosystem. 
China is in the critical moment of economic and political development. Globalization has 
profoundly changed China’s economy and the society. To play a greater role in global 
governance should be one of the next major goals of China’s foreign policy and international 
strategy. The global governance will create further favorable and peaceful international 
environment to the modernization and development of China. Chinese people must realize 
that the solution of more and more domestic problems depends on the outside global issues, 
and to resolve many global problems requires strong and effective policy and actions of 
China. 
Nevertheless, China still needs in-depth understanding of global governance. China is lack of 
sense of urgency of global governance. Many Chinese people still think they live in an 
international world rather than a global world, so it is necessary to further emancipate the 
mind. The rapid economic development has not only brought China with economic 
prosperity, but also brought many social, environmental, human rights and other problems. 
These problems have serious global consequences. China’s pursuit is to be a responsible 
state, and a responsible globalized country needs to continue to strengthen its capacity, not 
only for China’s own problems, but also for assuming greater responsibility for solutions of 
global problems. 
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